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Justice Visualized: Courts and the
Body Camera Revolution
Mary D. Fan*
What really happened? For centuries, courts have been magisterially
blind, cloistered far away from the contested events that they adjudicate,
relying primarily on testimony to get the story — or competing stories.
Whether oral or written, this testimony is profoundly human, with all the
passions, partisanship and imperfections of human perception. Now a
revolution is coming. Across the nation, police departments are deploying
body cameras. Analyzing body camera policies from police departments
across the nation, the article reveals an unfolding future where much of
the main staple events of criminal procedure law will be recorded. Much of
the current focus is on how body cameras will impact policing and public
opinion. Yet there is another important audience for body camera footage
— the courts that forge constitutional criminal procedure, the primary
conduct rules for police. This article explores what the coming power to

* Copyright © 2016 Mary D. Fan. Henry M. Jackson Professor of Law, University
of Washington School of Law. Many thanks to Ed Cheng, Tiffany L. Camp, Sarah E.
Dunaway, Elisa Hahn, Sophie Jin, Taryn Jones, Cheryl Nyberg, Emily Siess, Sandra
Sivinski, Mary Whisner, and Alena Wolotira for excellent teamwork on policygathering and coding. I am also very grateful to Andrew Crespo, Thomas Clancy, Aya
Gruber, Richard McAdams, Robert Mikos, Eric Miller, Richard Myers, Chris Slobogin
and the participants at the Vanderbilt Criminal Justice Roundtable for superb insights
and to Kimberly Procida and the team at the UC Davis Law Review for excellent
editing.
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replay a wider array of police enforcement actions than ever before means
for judicial review and criminal procedure law.
The body camera revolution means an evidentiary revolution for courts,
transforming the traditional reliance on reports and testimony and filling
in gaps in a domain where defendants are often silent. The article proposes
rules of judicial review to cultivate regular use of the audiovisual record in
criminal procedure cases and discourage gaps and omissions due to
selective recording. The article also offers rules of restraint against the
seductive power of video to seem to depict the unmediated truth. Camera
perspective can subtly shape judgments. Personal worldviews influence
image interpretation. And there is often a difference between the legally
relevant truth and the depiction captured on video. Care must be taken
therefore to apply the proper perceptual yardsticks and reserve
interpretive questions for the appropriate fact-finders.
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When justice removes the blindfold, vision of injustice is
actually possible. Just as the veil is an obfuscation, so is the
blindfold. . . . [B]lindness is no romantic trait.
— Imani Perry1
INTRODUCTION
In the half-century since the rights revolution created constitutional
criminal procedure, courts have been the central referees adjudicating
what is fair or foul play in the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.”2 Unlike a referee on the field, however, courts must make the
calls far removed in time and place from the actual hotly contested
events.3 Magisterially blind and cloistered away, courts are frequently
reliant on deeply divergent and partisan accounts.4
Did Walter’s girlfriend Roxanne consent to a search of their home or
did police coerce her into letting them in by threatening to take away
her child if she did not?5 Did Andre interfere with the capture of a
runaway suspect while screaming profanities, then push and try to
1 Imani Perry, Occupying the Universal, Embodying the Subject, 17 LAW & LIT. 97,
116 (2005).
2 This game metaphor is oft-recurring in constitutional criminal procedure. E.g.,
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014); Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 368 (1998); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 351 (1987); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). For a discussion of the role of courts in framing
conduct rules for police, see Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2471-503
(1996). For accounts of the genesis of constitutional criminal procedure in the 1960s
civil rights revolution, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword:
The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1156-60 (1998); Michael
J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 5077 (2000); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 159-73 (1980);
Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 438-46 (1980).
3 See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1255 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“We have repeatedly and recently warned appellate courts, ‘far removed
from the scene,’ against second-guessing the judgments made by the police . . . .”);
Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 475 (2012) (per curiam) (noting that appellate courts
are “far removed from the scene” where officers operate).
4 Cf. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION,
CONTROVERSY AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 91 (2011)
(discussing the representation of justice as blindfolded); Perry, supra note 1, at 116.
5 See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1143 n.5 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting conflicting accounts between police officers and the defendant’s
battered girlfriend over whether she consented to a search or acquiesced when
threatened with removal of her child).
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fight an officer?6 Or was Andre actually a witness to police beating a
suspect and arrested on the pretext that he smelled of weed when he
tried to speak up?7
Did E.E. undergo physical and mental abuse and sleep-deprivation
for 36 hours, or was he “cool,” “calm, “collected,” and “normal” when
he confessed to murder?8 And did he even confess or did police make
up a confession when he refused to crack?9
After being pulled over for having a broken taillight, did Walter try
to grab the officer’s stun gun forcing the officer to shoot him?10 Or did
the officer shoot Walter in the back eight times when he was running
away?11 Did police discover — or plant — the murder victim Teresa’s
car keys in Steven’s bedroom and Steven’s blood in the victim’s car?12
Blind justice, or justice guided heavily by testimony in a system
where one party is often silent and both sides wage fierce credibility
wars, poses the risk of being incomplete justice.13 What if courts had
the capacity to replay what happened? The event replay power is
becoming a reality for a wider array of investigative activities than ever
before as a wave of police departments around the country begin
6

See Jones v. United States, 16 A.3d 966, 968-69 (D.C. 2011).
See id. at 968.
8 See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 151-52 (1944) (noting sharply
divergent accounts between the defendant and the police).
9 See id. at 150 (noting the defendant’s claim that he did not confess).
10 See Alan Blinder & Manny Fernandez, Residents Trace Police Shooting to a Crime
Strategy Gone Awry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2015, at A1; Mark Berman, S.C. Investigators Say
They Thought Fatal Police Shooting Was Suspicious Before Video Emerged, WASH. POST (Apr.
10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/04/10/southcarolina-investigators-say-they-thought-fatal-police-shooting-was-suspicious-before-videoemerged/.
11 Matt Apuzzo & Timothy Williams, Citizen’s Videos Raise Questions on Police
Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2015, at A1.
12 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8, Wisconsin v. Avery, No. 2010AP411-CR
(Wis. Ct. App. June 25, 2010), 2010 WL 2691415 (recounting the defense theory that
the police planted the evidence); Making a Murderer (Netflix 2015) (suggesting the
police planted the evidence); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sparks, 746 N.E.2d 133,
138 (Mass. 2001) (alleging that police planted evidence found in his living quarters);
Reed v. State, No. 62117, 2013 WL 3256317, at *1 (Nev. June 12, 2013) (discussing
the defendant’s argument that his defense counsel was deficient for not contending the
search of his car was non-consensual and that the police planted the evidence); People
v. McGirt, 603 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (App. Div. 1993) (discussing defendant’s claim that
that the police “hassle” him every day and that on the day of his arrest, they planted
evidence on him after using a ruse to get him out of his parents’ apartment to search
him”); State v. Pogue, 17 P.3d 1272, 1275 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing the
defendant’s claim that the police planted the drug evidence during a vehicle search).
13 See discussion infra Part I.A.
7
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deploying police-worn body cameras.14 Small enough to be worn on
the head, ear, or chest, a body camera can go everywhere officers go,
providing audiovisual recording of what officers see, hear and do.15
Spurred by the turmoil around the nation over policing practices, a
police body camera revolution is fast unfolding, with numerous
departments announcing body camera programs in 2015.16 Many
major police departments are planning to start or expand body camera
programs throughout their forces in 2016.17 There are important open
policy questions and different approaches surrounding body cameras,
including what officers will be required to record, or not record, and
the discretionary model in each jurisdiction.18
Based on an analysis of the available body camera policies from
police departments serving the 100 largest cities in the nation, this
article envisions a future where police officers will be able to record
many of the most contested events in criminal procedure.19 While
14 See infra Part II.B and Table 1 (presenting results of research on plans to deploy
body cameras in the 100 largest cities in the United States).
15 See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, A PRIMER ON BODYWORN CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 5-6 (2012), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00Body-Worn-Cameras-508.pdf (discussing size, wearability and audiovisual capacity of
body-worn cameras); S.F. POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS POLICY, RECOMMENDED
DRAFT 1 (2015) (defining a body-worn cameras as “a small audio-video recorder with
the singular purpose of recording audio/visual files, specifically designed to be
mounted on a person”).
16 See infra Part I.B for a discussion; see also, e.g., Max Ehrenfreund, Body Cameras
for Cops Could Be the Biggest Change to Come out of the Ferguson Protests, WASH. POST
(Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/02/bodycameras-for-cops-could-be-the-biggest-change-to-come-out-of-the-ferguson-protests/
(discussing rapidly spreading movement to adopt body cameras); Josh Sanburn, The
One Battle Michael Brown’s Family Will Win, TIME (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://time.com/3606376/police-cameras-ferguson-evidence (discussing the building
movement toward body cameras).
17 See infra Part II.B and Table 1 for a discussion.
18 See, e.g., Developments in the Law, Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1794, 1805-14 (2015) (noting numerous important open questions about body
cameras that remain to be answered).
19 See infra Part II; see also, e.g., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, SPECIAL ORDER S03-14 § V.E.
(Dec. 30, 2015) (effective Jan. 1, 2016) (on file with author) (requiring recording of
routine calls for service, investigatory stops, foot pursuits, search warrant execution,
and “any other instance when enforcing the law,” as well as traffic stops, vehicle
pursuits and emergency driving situations); D.C. METRO. POLICE, GEN. ORDER 302, NO.
13, at 6-8 (June 29, 2015) (on file with author) (requiring officers to initiate bodyworn cameras when responding to calls for service, “at the beginning of any selfinitiated police action,” “[a]ll contacts initiated pursuant to a law enforcement
investigation, whether criminal or civil,” all stops, all pursuits, use of force situations,
arrests, searches, prisoner transports and an array of other enforcement activities);
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body camera policies tend to differ widely on privacy and victim
protection shut-off provisions, there is greater convergence regarding
enforcement activities that officers must record.20 Numerous policies
provide that, at a minimum, police officers will now record stops,
searches, responses to calls for service, pursuits, uses of force, arrests,
and transportation of arrestees.21 This article explores what the
capacity to replay body camera footage of a wider array of police
enforcement actions than ever before means for judicial review and
criminal procedure law.
The body camera revolution poses a major paradigm shift for courts
in criminal cases for three reasons: comprehensiveness, detail and
volume. In an increasing number of jurisdictions, courts have access
to recordings of police interrogations.22 Patrol vehicle dash cameras
can also yield relevant footage, albeit sometimes at an awkward
distance or angle.23 But body-worn video will cover a much wider
Intradepartmental Correspondence from the Chief of Police, L.A. Police Dep’t, to the
Honorable Board of Police Commissioners, L.A. Police Dep’t 2 (Apr. 23, 2015) (on file
with author) (requiring activation of body-worn video equipment during calls for
service, pedestrian stops, “officer-initiated consensual encounters,” foot pursuits,
searches, arrests, uses of force, in-custody transports, victim and witness interviews,
and crowd management, as well as vehicle stops); N.Y. POLICE DEPT., OPERATIONS
ORDER NO. 48 2 (Dec. 2, 2014) (on file with author) (providing that officers
participating in the body-worn camera pilot program shall activate the cameras during
stops and frisks, enforcement encounters involving violations or petty offenses,
attempts to take persons into custody, “[a]ny public interaction regardless of context,
that escalates and becomes adversarial,” uses of force, “[a]ll interior vertical patrols of
non-Housing Authority buildings and Housing Authority buildings, as well as vehicle
stops); PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 4.21 § 4A (Apr. 20, 2015) (on file with author)
(requiring recording during any pedestrian investigation, when initiating an arrest or
citation, or handling a disturbance or crisis, at any protest or demonstration and
“[w]hen confronted by any member of the general public that is or may become
confrontational, antagonistic or hostile”).
20 See infra Part II (reporting findings of convergence around activities required to
be recorded). For a discussion of the privacy and public disclosure balances being
struck, see Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, and Police Body Cameras: The
National Policy Split, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2016) [hereinafter Police Body Cameras].
21 See infra Part II.A and Table 2.
22 See G. Daniel Lassiter, Patrick J. Munhall, Andrew L. Geers, Paul E. Weiland &
Ian M. Handley, Accountability and the Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped
Confessions, 1 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 53, 54 (2001) [hereinafter Camera
Perspective Bias] (noting estimates that more than half of law enforcement agencies
videotape some interrogations).
23 See, e.g., Lard v. State, 431 S.W.3d 249, 255, 264-65 (Ark. 2014) (holding that
the trial court did not err in allowing the government to play dash camera footage of
the defendant killing a police officer in a capital case); Commonwealth v. Favinger,
No. 1678 MDA 2013, 2014 WL 10987112, at *7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (noting that the
trial court adjudicating the suppression motion reviewed the dash camera video to
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array of police enforcement activities than interrogations or
encounters that happen near a police vehicle.24 Body-worn cameras
can go to places police cars cannot, such as porches, homes, on foot
patrol, while executing warrants, and more.25
Body cameras record events closer up, yielding more detail than ever
before captured by testimony or a dash camera.26 Compare, for
instance the two stills below from video of police responding to a call
about a man at the side of the road armed with a knife who had
stabbed himself in the stomach.27 The still on the left is from the dash
determine whether there was probable cause to stop the defendant for not driving in
his lane but “it was very difficult to see from the video the distance” the defendant was
traveling over the line and therefore the court relied on testimony).
24 See infra Part II.B and supra note 19; see also, e.g., ATLANTA POLICE DEP’T,
ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY MANUAL, SPECIAL ORDER APD.SO.14.05, at 2-3
(2014) (on file with author) (requiring recording of pedestrian stops, field interviews,
foot pursuits, search warrant executions, victim and witness interviews as well as
traffic-related law enforcement activities); AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T, AUSTIN POLICE
DEPARTMENT POLICY MANUAL, POLICY 303, at 125-26 (2015) (on file with author)
(requiring recording of warrant service, investigatory stops, and “any contact that
becomes adversarial in an incident that would not otherwise require recording” as
well as traffic stops); HOUSTON POLICE DEP’T, DRAFT GEN. ORDER 400-28 5-6 (2015) (on
file with author) (requiring body-worn camera activation when “[a]rriving on scene to
any call for service, . . . [s]elf-initiating a law enforcement activity,” initiating a stop,
conducting searches, during transportation after arrest, while interviewing witnesses
and complainants as well as during vehicular stops and pursuits); S.F. POLICE DEP’T,
supra note 15, at 2-3 (2015) (on file with author) (requiring recording of detention
and arrests, “consensual encounters,” pedestrian stops, foot pursuits, service of search
or arrest warrants, consent-based as well as suspicion-based searches, transportation
of arrestees and detainees, and “[d]uring any citizen encounter that becomes hostile”
as well as vehicle pursuits and traffic stops).
25 See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 5-6 (discussing small size,
portability and wearability of body-worn cameras); see also supra notes 19–24
(offering examples of where officers must activate their body-worn cameras).
26 See, e.g., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 19, § V.E. (requiring recording of the
entire incident); OAKLAND POLICE DEP’T, DEPARTMENTAL GENERAL ORDER I-15.1,
PORTABLE VIDEO MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 3-4 (July 16, 2015) (requiring body camera
activation prior to a long list of enforcement activities and continued recording until
the conclusion of the event unless privacy exceptions apply); Intradepartmental
Correspondence from the Chief of Police, L.A. Police Dep’t, to the Honorable Board of
Police Commissioners, L.A. Police Dep’t, supra note 19, at 2 (requiring recording of
the entire contact); see also, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 6 (describing
body-worn camera resolution specifications and mounting considerations to capture
data).
27 The videos are available at Raw Leak, Police Release Videos of Fatal Shooting,
YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-iWN7UfoJQ.
Pursuant to a records request, the New Hampshire Attorney General released four
videos of the shooting: one from a vehicle equipped with a dash camera and three
body-worn camera videos. Mike Cronin, Dashboard Video Shows Fatal Shooting of Man
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camera. The still on the right is from the body-worn video of one of
the officers involved.

View from patrol vehicle
dash camera

View from officer-worn
body camera

The much greater comprehensiveness of coverage exponentially
expands the volume of video relevant to search and seizure
suppression issues that courts and litigants will be able to access as a
routine matter.28 With rapidly spreading uptake, body cameras have
the potential to be disruptive technology in the sense of having the
transformative power to shake up old ways of analyzing criminal
procedure cases.29 Events previously reconstructed primarily by
testimony readily reducible to text for appellate review will now be
captured on video that offers trial and appellate judges the opportunity
Who Ran at Police, WMUR9 ABC, http://www.wmur.com/news/dashboard-videoshows-fatal-shooting-of-man-who-ran-at-police/35488864 (last updated Sept. 25,
2015, 11:55 PM).
28 See, e.g., Josh Sanburn, Storing Body Cam Data Is the Next Big Challenge for
Police, TIME (Jan. 25, 2016), http://time.com/4180889/police-body-cameras-vievutaser/ (reporting estimate that big-city police departments are generating more than
10,000 hours of video a week).
29 See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 7-28 (3d ed. 2003)
(discussing the concept of disruptive technology in the private sector); Tom Casady,
Hidden Cost of Body Cameras, DIRECTOR’S DESK (Oct. 31, 2014, 6:12 AM),
http://lpd304.blogspot.com/2014/10/hidden-cost-of-body-worn-cameras.html
(“In
some ways, [body-worn video] is a disruptive technology: a game-changer that leap
frogs vehicle-mounted systems.”).
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— and temptation — to see and decide for themselves what
happened.30
When the Supreme Court decided the fate of a civil suit against
police based on police vehicle dash camera footage, scholars expressed
concern.31 In Scott v. Harris, the Court ruled that no reasonable juror
could agree with the plaintiff’s account that the police used excessive
force in the car chase and granted summary judgment for the
government.32 Scholars wrote that the Court was overstepping the role
of an appellate court and depriving jurors of a chance to decide.33
Neither Scott v. Harris nor the debate over it has explored the larger
question of how trial and appellate courts should exercise the event
replay power in the much more frequent context of deciding search
and seizure suppression motions where judges rather than juries find
the facts and forge the bulk of criminal procedure law.34
An examination of the implications of body camera footage for
judicial review and criminal procedure law is needed as potentially
millions of hours of video evidence covering events previously
relegated to competing witness accounts becomes available to courts
and litigants.35 This article fills that gap, exploring the implications of
the event replay power that body-worn cameras will give courts.
30 Cf. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 534
(1992) (“The model of contemporary law remains largely print-based.”).
31 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling
Take on Excessive-Force Claims, 43 TRIAL 74, 76 (2007) (“[I]t is deeply troubling when
an appellate court, acting on its own, watches a tape and decides the facts of a case for
itself.”); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v. Harris and
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841-42 (2009) (arguing the
Court was wrong to privilege its own view of the video and deny jurors the
opportunity to interpret it based on their worldviews).
32 Scott, 550 U.S. at 386.
33 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 76; Kahan et al., supra note 31, at 841-42.
34 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question
about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”);
United States v. Simpson, 992 F.2d 1224, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing factfinding by judge at suppression hearing); United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791
(9th Cir. 1981) (discussing standards of review for factual findings by the trial judge
at a suppression hearing).
35 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 74 (predicting that judicial decisionmaking that entails reviewing videotape of the contested incident “is likely to become
a trend” and “raises serious questions about what is appropriate evidence for appeals
courts to consider”); Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The
Constitutionality and Propriety of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2012) (“Technological advances that can put
appellate judges in shoes that very much resemble those of jurors and trial judges raise
questions about whether appellate courts should defer to judges and juries as they
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Part I discusses the problems with the primacy of orality and text in
the criminal procedure context, where part of the story is often
missing because of the formidable reasons for defendants to remain
silent. This part also discusses the growing evidence of the frailties of
human perception and the fierce intractable credibility contests that
ensue when defendants contest the government’s account. This part
discusses how body cameras are disruptive technology with the
potential to transform this tradition.
Part II presents findings from a study of the body camera practices
and recording policies among police departments serving the largest
100 cities in America to show what is in store for courts and litigants.
The findings show the prevalence of a limited discretion model
whereby police are required to record the law enforcement encounters
that are central to the daily work of courts adjudicating criminal
procedure questions. This means that the body camera revolution will
also be an evidentiary revolution for courts.
Part III argues that in deciding search and seizure suppression
matters, where criminal procedure law is primarily forged and applied,
trial and appellate courts should regularly consult the audiovisual as
well as textual record. To discourage selective recording and nonrecording, courts should also inquire into why video footage that
should be present under departmental policy is missing. Body-worn
video can give courts a better vantage about what happens on the
ground to more accurately judge what counts as fair or foul play.
Body-worn video is a particularly important source of information in a
system where the defendant often has strong disincentives to testify
and may stay silent rather than risk taking the stand in a suppression
hearing or trial.36 This part also addresses conflicting positions taken
by appellate courts over whether to review videos admitted below and
confusion over the proper role of appellate courts when it comes to
the audiovisual record.
While the ability to clarify opaque areas of the law and get a fuller
sense of what happened can be beneficial, there is a need for
audiovisual literacy and rules of restraint. Part III discusses the myth
of camera objectivity and presents scientific evidence and cinematic
traditionally have done . . . .”).
36 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1449-50, 1458 (2005) (“The United States’s criminal justice
system is shaped by a fundamental absence: Criminal defendants rarely speak. From
the first Miranda warnings through trial until sentencing, defendants are constantly
encouraged to be quiet . . . . No government actor is permitted to obtain information
from them, and they are largely expected to remain silent in court as well.”).
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theory on subtle persuasion effects in camera perspective. This Part
also argues for judicial restraint and caution in indulging the ability to
see and decide for oneself in two important contexts. The first is on
factual questions properly reserved for a jury, such as matters that go
to guilt, innocence or liability. The second is on criminal procedure
questions where the relevant truth is what actors perceived and
believed at the time, not what a camera’s angle — free of stress and
fear and viewed coolly in hindsight — can catch.
I.

THE CAMERA CULTURAL REVOLUTION

I wouldn’t know what to say to officers who didn’t think they
were on camera all the time, everywhere. At this point, you
would just look at them and you say, “Seriously?” And then
maybe sit them in a room for a day and have them read the
newspaper. I think there is a general understanding that
cameras are everywhere all the time.37
Small portable cameras are everywhere, part of the cell phones that
people wear like bodily appendages.38 In the United States, 91% of
adults have cell phones.39 And not just any old clunky cell phone —
56% of adults have smartphones.40 More than any time in human
history, people live their lives under a camera’s eye — in selfies, in
home-made video clips, caught on someone else’s camera.41 Every day
on average in 2014, people uploaded 1.8 billion digital images — a
total of 657 billion photos a year.42
Steve Mann famously termed the small cameras affixed to small
entities such as individuals and ubiquitously deployed today

37 Interview with Lt. Joel Guay, Seattle Police Dep’t (Jan. 25, 2016) (video of
interview on file with author).
38 See generally Aaron Smith, The Best (and Worst) of Mobile Connectivity, PEW RES.
CTR. (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/11/30/the-best-and-worst-ofmobile-connectivity/.
39 Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults, PEW RES. CTR. (June 6,
2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits91-of-adults/.
40 Aaron Smith, Smartphone Ownership — 2013 Update, PEW RES. CTR. (June 5,
2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone-ownership-2013/.
41 Rose Eveleth, How Many Photographs of You Are Out There in the World?,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/
how-many-photographs-of-you-are-out-there-in-the-world/413389/; see also NEAL
FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY 14 (2009).
42 Eveleth, supra note 41.
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“sousveillance devices.”43 The term sousveillance captures the shift in
power relations between the persons conducting the observation or
recording and the subject, as well as the re-positioning of the cameras
so that it is not necessarily hovering from a building or other entity
above.44 The entity doing the recording or observing is no longer in a
superior position of power over the subject — citizens exercise
bottom-up control when recording the police to monitor the
watchmen.45
Going further than the sousveillance imagery, I suggest that our
modern condition is one of toutveillance. Toutveillance is not the topdown of surveillance, nor the bottom-up of sousveillance, but a
modern condition where everyone has incentive to record to contest
or control the narrative. Any ordinary Chris,46 Feidin,47 or Ramsey48
can record the police and release a viral video shot from his point of
view. Police departments in turn have incentive to deploy body
cameras to offer a competing visual depiction shot from their
perspective.49 In a toutveillance society — where everybody is
watching everybody, taking photos, and recording video — perhaps
what is more remarkable is that so many enforcement encounters still
have to be reconstructed in court through testimony and reports
without event replay.50
43 Steve Mann, Veillance and Reciprocal Transparency: Surveillance Versus
Sousveilance, AR Glass, Lifeglogging, and Wearable Computing, 2013 PROC. IEEE INT’L
SYMP. ON TECH. & SOC’Y 1, 1.
44 Id. at 3-4.
45 Id.
46 Air Reserve Base worker Chris LeDay played an important role in disseminating
the video of the shooting of Alton Sterling to the public. Peter Holley, ‘Super-Fishy’:
Man Who Posted Video of Alton Sterling Killing Claims Employer Still Refusing to Let Him
Work, WASH. POST (July 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2016/07/13/man-who-posted-video-of-alton-sterling-killing-claims-he-wastargeted-by-vengeful-police/?utm_term=.2c4e3f596bee.
47 Immigrant barber Feidin Santana recorded the shooting of Walter Scott in
South Carolina. Feidin Santana, Who Recorded Police Shooting of Walter Scott, Speaks
Out, NBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/feidin-santanawho-recorded-man-shot-police-officer-speaks-out-n338171.
48 Deli worker Ramsey Orta filmed the death of Eric Garner. J. David Goodman,
Man Who Filmed Fatal Police Chokehold Is Arrested on Weapons Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2014, at A19.
49 See, e.g., POLICE COMPLAINTS BD., ENHANCING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH
AN EFFECTIVE ON-BODY CAMERA PROGRAM FOR MPD OFFICERS 3-4 (2014) (discussing
hopes that body cameras will offer more accurate evidence); Editorial, Dueling
Cameras, BALT. SUN, Nov. 13, 2006, at 10A (discussing issues with competitive and
selective filming).
50 Cf. Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, The Generalized Sousveillance Society, 49 SOC. SCI.
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This part begins by discussing the challenges of establishing what
actually happened in adjudicating criminal procedure questions in a
system where testimony and text reign supreme. Defendants face
dilemmas about whether to remain silent or offer their side of the
story. When the questions are contested, ugly credibility contests can
ensue, where the defendant and the police are accused of malfeasance
and lying. Especially in criminal cases, where the human stakes are
high, the reliability of testimony and the partisan nature of human
perception are under fire. We then turn to the recent convergence in
interests of an array of unlikely bedfellows to spread the use of body
cameras across the nation, ushering in a new era of evidence in
criminal procedure cases.
A. The Problems with the Primacy of Testimony and Text
The case sounds like any of the legions of drug possession cases
commonplace in the courts and criminal procedure canon.51 The basis
for the arrest was possession of a controlled substance.52 Officers
initially stopped Kenneth Simmons for riding a bicycle in the park at
night without his lights on.53 When the officers approached him,
Simmons pedaled his bike rapidly away and did not stop when
ordered to do so.54 The police report states that when officers
apprehended him, Simmons rolled around, flopped his legs, tried to
kick officers, and pulled out a knife, which officers removed.55
Regarding the search that ultimately yielded the contraband, the
report stated:
INFO. 489, 489 (2010) (theorizing sousveillance as “the present state of modern
technological societies where anybody may take photos or videos of any person or
event, and then diffuse the information freely all over the world”).
51 See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 38-43 (1992) (discussing the main staple cases in a
criminal court); Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the
Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 439, 448-49 (1999) (discussing the cyclical nature of addiction and criminal
prosecution and the large judicial workload due to drug and alcohol abuse-related
cases).
52 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11350(a) (2016) (prohibiting possession of a
controlled substance).
53 San Diego Reg’l Officer’s Report Narrative, Incident No. 14050033181, from
Officer Robles and Officer Williams (May 17, 2014) [hereinafter Simmons Police
Report] (on file with author).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 3-4.
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I saw Simmons grabbing towards his right pants pocket. We
were able to gain control of Simmons. I grabbed Simmons [sic]
right hand and started to search Simmons. When I would
search his right pocket he would try rolling over so I could not
search him. I was able to search his picket and did not find any
controlled substances or weapons. I search [sic] Simmons
right coin pocket and discovered a clear plastic baggy with a
rock like substance that I recognized as a controlled
substance.56
At the preliminary hearing, the officers involved similarly testified as
to the chase, the struggle, and the discovery of the drugs in the
suspect’s pocket.57
Now view and listen to the body camera video.58 Because a video
cannot be reproduced in text, stills from the video are offered below.
Like all the other stills from body camera footage presented in this
article, the images are in the public domain, released to the public
pursuant to public records requests or pursuant to departmental
policy.

56

Id. at 4.
Preliminary Hearing and Arraignment Transcript at 6-10, People v. Simmons,
No. SCD-256148 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2014).
58 Allison Ash, Raw Video from SDPD Officer’s Body Camera Shows Man’s Arrest at
Park, YOUTUBE (Jun. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Simmons Body Camera Video],
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OvbgZFQYG18 (containing footage originally
shown on ABC10 News). The video first shows officers pulling Simmons off his bike
and arresting him. The search begins at 2:35 in the video.
57
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During much of the search, Simmons’s pants are pulled down and
his buttocks are exposed.59 As multiple officers involved in the search
lift, turn and search him, he is crying out, panting, and voicing fear.60
There are indications that he may have defecated in fear.61 Most of the
search footage is focused on Simmons’s buttocks and groin region,
indicating the area of focus by the officer wearing the camera, but later
we finally see Simmons’ face, swollen and bloody.62
The summary in the report does not capture the full experience of
the search shown in the video — nor even what two stills from the
video can convey. The contrast between video, testimony, and report
dramatically captures how the camera can reveal far more than
testimony or reports. Even a factually accurate summary of events
from the officer’s perception may leave out important facts.63 Yet
judges decide most criminal procedure cases based on testimony or
declarations — including hearsay testimony from persons without
personal knowledge of the events relying on police reports.64 At
suppression hearings to determine the admissibility of evidence, the
rules of evidence applicable in criminal trials do not apply.65 There are
at least three major troubles with the reliance on testimony and
reports in criminal procedure cases: (1) the frequent silence of one
side, (2) the growing evidence of the partiality and fallibility of
perceptions, and (3) ugly credibility contests in which neither the
defendant nor the police emerge unscathed.

59

Id. at 2:58–6:36.
Id.
61 Id. at 4:38–4:55; see also Second Amended Complaint for Damages and Demand
for Jury Trial at 7, Simmons v. San Diego, Case No. 30-2015-00803397-CU-PO-CJC
(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Simmons v. San Diego, Second Amended
Complaint] (alleging he partially defecated in fear).
62 Simmons Body Camera Video, supra note 58, at 7:19–7:30.
63 In the Simmons case, there is a pending lawsuit over whether the report and
testimony by the officers accurately captured the events. See Second Amended
Complaint, supra note 61, at 7-8. This article does not take a stand on the accuracy of
the testimony or reports but simply points out that even assuming the reports and
testimony are accurate from the officer’s perception, many important details are lost in
the reconstruction by reports and testimony.
64 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that a court deciding preliminary
questions such as the admissibility of evidence “is not bound by evidence rules, except
those on privilege”); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1974)
(explaining that hearsay is admissible at hearings to determine the admissibility of
evidence).
65 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
60
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Defendant Silence

When reading constitutional criminal procedure cases, one
sometimes marvels at the facts — and the information gaps between
the facts. How did Michael Whren just happen to be holding two large
plastic bags of cocaine boldly in plain view when the police officers he
saw tailing him pulled him over and walked up to his car?66 When
Officer Lang asked Christopher Drayton “Mind if I check you?” after
arresting Drayton’s travel companion and Drayton lifted his hands
eight inches from his legs, was that really an expression of consent or
submission to authority?67 It seems that one part of the story — one
whole side of the story — is missing.68 Why?
One major reason for the seeming one-sidedness of the facts in
many criminal procedure cases is that the other key party to the event
— the defendant — has several formidable reasons to stay silent. A
defendant who takes the stand loses the shelter of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and may be crossexamined by the prosecution on issues reasonably related to his direct
testimony.69 A decision by the defendant to testify is thus also a
66

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808-09 (1996).
See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 199 (2002).
68 From the filings, it appears that the testifying persons at the suppression
hearings were all government agents, not the defendants. See Brief for Petitioner at 3,
Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841), 1996 WL 75758, at *3-4 (discussing the lineup of
witnesses at the suppression hearing); Brief for Appellant at 6-8, Brown v. United
States, 231 F.3d 787 (2000) (No. 99-15152-I), 1999 WL 33616942, at *6-8; see also,
e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Song Remains the Same: The Story of Whren v. United
States, in RACE LAW STORIES 419, 428-29 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado
eds., 2008) (discussing the suppression hearing generally). Scholars have also
suggested the officers’ side of the story in Whren is improbable and needs greater
scrutiny and adversarial examination. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 384 (1998) (discussing concern over police perjury
in a case like Whren); I. Bennet Capers, The Fourth Problem, 49 TULSA L. REV. 431, 435
n.34 (2013) (book review) [hereinafter Fourth Problem] (discussing “the improbability
of the officers’ version of the events and the likelihood that they in fact engaged in
‘testilying’” in Whren and noting that “both officers have been the subject of
misconduct allegations, including allegations of planting evidence and providing false
testimony”).
69 See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971) (“It has long been
held that a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf cannot then claim the
privilege against cross-examination on matters reasonably related to the subject matter
of his direct examination. It is not thought overly harsh in such situations to require
that the determination whether to waive the privilege take into account the matters
which may be brought out on cross-examination.” (citations omitted)); Rogers v.
United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (“[I]f the witness himself elects to waive his
privilege, as he may doubtless do, since the privilege is for his protection and not for
67
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decision to “waive his privilege completely” and “having once cast
aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at will, whenever
cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing.”70
Deciding to speak and becoming subject to cross-examination can
be more than just inconvenient or embarrassing for a defendant — it
can destroy his case and credibility. A testifying defendant faces the
risk of impeachment by reference to his prior convictions.71 The
testifying defendant also incurs the risk of impeachment by evidence
suppressed because of a search or seizure in violation of the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.72 Defendant testimony at a
suppression hearing also presents special challenges because
prosecutors can use inconsistencies in testimony at the suppression
hearing to impeach him if he testifies at trial, though suppression
hearing testimony cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt at
trial.73
If a defendant stays silent, the prosecution may not suggest that
adverse inferences be drawn from that silence.74 Indeed a defendant is
entitled to a jury instruction that no adverse inferences may be drawn
from silence.75 But if the defendant chooses to testify, “his failure to
deny or explain evidence of incriminating circumstances of which he
may have knowledge may be the basis of adverse inference, and the
jury may be so instructed.”76
that of other parties, and discloses his criminal connections, he is not permitted to
stop, but must go on and make a full disclosure.” (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 597 (1896))).
70 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 419 (1957).
71 See, e.g., Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 759 (2000) (“It is also generally
recognized that a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf may be impeached
by proof of prior convictions or the like . . . .” (quoting McGautha, 402 U.S. at 215)).
72 See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980).
73 Compare Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (“[W]e find it
intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to
assert another. We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support of a
motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not
thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
objection.”), with People v. Douglas, 136 Cal. Rptr. 358, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
(“We conclude that defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing may be used for
impeachment purposes if he takes the stand at his trial and testifies in a manner
inconsistent with his pretrial testimony.”), and People v. Mahone, 614 N.Y.S.2d 409,
411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“It was not improper for the prosecutor to use
inconsistencies between defendant’s testimony at the suppression hearing and at trial
to impeach him.”).
74 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
75 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981).
76 Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 494 (1926).
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A defendant who wants to tell his side of the story must weigh the
benefits against the substantial potential costs of taking the stand.77
The balance of costs and benefits is such that lawyers often advise
defendants to not take the stand and remain silent.78 Thus, defendant
silence is prevalent throughout the criminal process, including at
hearings to contest the admissibility of evidence based on claims of
wrongful search or seizure.79 This typically means that judges
dependent on traditional testimony hear one side of the story more
prominently than the other.
Sometimes snippets of the defendant’s voice emerge, memorialized
as evidence by the government.80 For example, the police report in
Simmons’ case stated that Simmons told officers: “I did not know you
were the police. I had my headphones in. I never looked back. I could
not hear you yelling at me. I knew that I had rocks on me. I only knew
that you were the police when we were fighting.”81 What the police
report states is important because it is what prosecutors, defense
attorneys and officers consult to understand or recall a case from
myriad others.82 When you view the body camera video you hear that
Simmons said a lot more about the search and seizure.83 But what is
77 See, e.g., Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 759-60 (2000) (“[I]t is not
thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require
the defendant to weigh such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify.”).
78 Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1458.
79 See id.
80 See, e.g., People v. Austin, No. 112721-U, 2013 WL 2302080, at * 3 (Ill. App.
Ct. May 24, 2013) (noting that while the defendant’s statements to the officer were
not taped, videorecorded or memorialized in report the “substance of the interview”
was included in the police report); State v. Ingram, 774 S.E.2d 433, 437 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2015) (reporting that the defendant’s statements while in the hospital after he
shot at officers and officers shot him were recorded in the police report); Sambolin v.
State, 387 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tenn. 1965) (noting that the defendants’ oral admissions
were made a part of the police report and discussing the admissibility of the
statements against the defendants).
81 Simmons Police Report, supra note 53, at 5.
82 Consider this compelling account:

And for the defender, the flow of cases is endless; a limitless stream of files.
A dozen or so clean, raw files appear on their desks in the morning, at most
containing a police report and the defendant’s application for indigent
defense. Into court they come, stack of files in hand, yelling to determine if
their clients have even shown up. ‘Is there a Mr. Firmen here? Is Ms. Nonce
in court?’
John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1240-41
(1994) [hereinafter Redefining].
83 Simmons Body Camera Video, supra note 58, at 2:35–6:36.
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memorialized is what has evidentiary value in the government’s case.84
Thus, without cameras, even when the defendant’s voice is heard, it is
filtered through reports as potential evidence.
2.

The Partiality and Fallibility of Perception

A second challenge of dependence on testimony and police reports
is that it relies on memory, often under stress.85 A large body of
important work has illuminated how our memory is not as
trustworthy a record as we believe, even when we are trying earnestly
to tell the truth.86 While much of the evidence is in the context of the
accuracy of eyewitness identification, the insights about memory apply
to other testimonial contexts.87 Despite the common perception that
we are better at remembering situations “burned into our memory”
because they occurred in high-stress situations, the scientific evidence
indicates that high stress actually negatively impacts memory.88 When

84

See Simmons Police Report, supra note 53, at 5.
See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (“Often
enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the
moment”); see also, e.g., WOODLAND POLICE DEP’T, GEN. ORDER. 4.09.03 (2009),
http://www.cityofwoodland.org/gov/depts/police/secure/order%20manual.pdf
(“The
arresting officer is responsible for the completion and submission for approval of all
arrest reports before the end of his/her shift.”); Terry A. Beehr et al., Working in a
Violent Environment: The Accuracy of Police Officers’ Reports About Shooting Incidents,
77 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 217, 230, 232 (2004) (discussing the
impact of stress on event recall by officers and the implications for police reports and
testimony).
86 See, e.g., BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 68 (1995) (reporting that more than 2,000
studies have been performed illuminating the problems with memory, perception and
eyewitness identification); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 52-133 (1996)
(discussing seminal studies and memory processes); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Make-Believe
Memories, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 867, 868-71 (2003) (reviewing findings on faulty
eyewitness memory).
87 Cf. Jack B. Weinstein, Eyewitness Testimony, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 442-43
(1981) (book review) (discussing insights from eyewitness memory studies for other
evidentiary contexts).
88 See, e.g., LOFTUS, supra note 86, at 33; Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A MetaAnalytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 687, 699 (2004); Charles A. Morgan, III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory
for Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 INT’L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 265, 265-67 (2004); Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken?: Testing
Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 179 (2006); see
also, e.g., JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO ET AL., PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF
INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 15-20 (2010) (describing attempt to memorize every detail
of assailant and certitude of identification that proved wrong).
85
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emotional arousal is intense, performance on memory tasks
significantly decreases in accuracy.89 Responding to stressful situations
divides our attention and reduces our capacity to process and
remember events.90
Whether stressed or not, humans are also vulnerable to
confirmation bias, the cognitive tendency to ignore facts that are
inconsistent with our hypotheses or beliefs and focus on details that
support them.91 If one suspects someone is guilty of a crime, one is
more likely to focus on information supporting that suspicion and
overlook information that would disconfirm the view.92 Confirmation
bias is not limited to police officers, of course — it is a human
cognitive tendency common to lay and professional persons.93 For
example, commentators have noted that judges also display
confirmation bias, tending to find errors harmless or not depending on
whether the court believes a defendant is guilty.94
We reason from schemata, mental categories for how situations will
play out based on our experiences and beliefs.95 If someone or some
situation resembles one previously experienced, these schemata shape
our expectancies and shape our perceptions to confirm our beliefs.96
In ambiguous situations where information is missing, schemata fill in
89

LOFTUS, supra note 86, at 33; Deffenbacher et al., supra note 88.
See Sven-Åke Christianson, Emotional Stress and Eyewitness Memory: A Critical
Review, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 284, 284-304 (1992); Maria S. Zaragoza & Sean M. Lane,
Processing Resources and Eyewitness Suggestibility, 3 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 305, 307-10 (1998).
91 See THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN
REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 33 (1991); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A
Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 198-99 (1998).
92 For a discussion and examples in the criminal context see, for example, Keith
A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, WIS. L. REV. 291, 296-316 (2006).
93 See Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the United States
Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 414, 421-28 (2011); James
Friedrich, Primary Error Detection and Minimization (PEDMIN) Strategies in Social
Cognition: A Reinterpretation of Confirmation Bias Phenomena, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 298,
298 (1993); Nickerson, supra note 91, at 175-218; Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag,
First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias, 114 Q.J. ECON. 37, 41-48
(1999).
94 Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should
Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (1995); Findley & Scott, supra
note 92, at 349-50.
95 See D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 14 (2002).
96 See id.
90
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the gaps, leading people to believe or perceive based on past
experiences and beliefs.97 To translate in terms of operations in the
field, an officer may reason thusly: I’ve caught a lot of guilty guys who
look like this one, in this high-crime area, and this one looks guilty
too.98
When a search or seizure yields evidence, hindsight bias and
outcome bias can reshape perceptions. Hindsight bias is a “knew-it-allalong” effect in which the outcome seems more likely in retrospect.99
Hindsight bias arises when we “update” our memory with the new
information, subtly reshaping our memory of what happened to make
the outcome appear more certain.100 Outcome bias is a related but
different cognitive distortion in which the outcome influences our
judgment about whether the judgment call was sound or wrong.101
The reiterative effect of documenting one’s judgment calls — in
reports, in testimony, for example — can further entrench subtly
reshaped memories because reiteration heightens the perception of
certainty.102
Hearing all sides of the story is thus all the more important because
of the fallibility of human perception and tendency toward unwitting

97

See id.
See also, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime
Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment
Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1595-1604 (2008) (discussing the use of a
claim that an encounter occurs in a high-crime area in supporting reasonable
suspicion); cf., e.g., John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in
Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 20-21 (1983) (finding evidence
that social labeling creates expectancies about true dispositions or capabilities).
99 See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288, 293, 296-97 (1975);
Erin M. Harley, Keri A. Carlsen & Geoffrey R. Loftus, The “Saw-It-All-Along” Effect:
Demonstrations of Visual Hindsight Bias, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 960, 962-64
(2004); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events
After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 311 (1990); Ulrich Hoffrage,
Ralph Hertwig & Gerd Gigerenzer, Hindsight Bias: A By-Product of Knowledge
Updating?, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 566, 566-67 (2000); Lawrence J. Sanna,
Norbert Schwarz, Eulena M. Small, Accessibility Experiences and the Hindsight Bias: I
Knew It All Along Versus It Could Never Have Happened, 30 MEMORY & COGNITION
1288, 1288-89 (2002).
100 See Ulrich Hoffrage & Ralph Hertwig, Hindsight Bias: A Price Worth Paying for
Fast and Frugal Memory, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 191 (1999).
101 See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 569-73 (1988).
102 See Ralph Hertwig, Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, The Reiteration Effect in
Hindsight Bias, 104 PSYCHOL. REV. 194, 194-96 (1997).
98
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distortions of perception.103 Yet as discussed in Part I.A.1, one of the
key participants, the defendant, has strong reasons to stay silent,
leaving part of the story untold.104 This compounds the problems with
reliance on testimony in reconstructing the facts and the need for
other sources of information that can show more of the story.
3.

Ugly Credibility Contests

The third challenge of traditional reliance on testimony and reports
is the ugly credibility contests that often ensue if the defendant does
dispute officer accounts. Neither side emerges unscathed —
defendants are often assumed to be lying criminals with serious
credibility problems.105 The police are impugned as liars, evidence
planters, and abusers of power.106 Courts are also burdened, awash in
deeply partisan and divergent stories in which both sides are
smeared.107
The credibility contest is an uneven one. Stories proffered by
defendants are more likely to be discounted; indeed defendants were
historically deemed unqualified to testify under oath.108 Claiming the
officer is lying is a risky move because it risks alienating the factfinder.109 Moreover, judges are keenly aware of the consequences of
103

See discussion and sources cited supra notes 86–102.
See discussion and sources cited supra notes 69–79.
105 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt
Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1695 (1987) (discussing the credibility difficulties
defendants face).
106 See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1143 n.5 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (noting the account of the defendant’s battered girlfriend that police
coerced her into letting them into the house by threatening to take her child away);
Jones v. United States, 16 A.3d 966, 968-69 (D.C. 2011) (discussing defendant’s
allegation that the police arrested him and roughed him up because he witnessed them
beating a suspect and tried to speak up); Commonwealth v. Sparks, 746 N.E.2d 133,
138 (Mass. 2001) (discussing the defendant’s allegation that police planted the
evidence found during the search of his home); People v. McGirt, 603 N.Y.S.2d 164,
165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (discussing defendant’s claim that that the planted
evidence on him after using a ruse to get him out of his parents’ apartment to search
him); State v. Pogue, 17 P.3d 1272, 1275 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (noting the
defendant’s claim that the police planted the drug evidence during a vehicle search).
107 See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 118 (1995) (noting that “the trial
judge will often have to weigh conflicting accounts of what transpired”).
108 Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 66 (2000).
109 See, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation: What Is
a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85,
116 (1999) (discussing how defendants face risks when telling stories that clash with
the schemata harbored by jurors).
104
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suggesting that the officer is a liar, which can end a career by
rendering the officer unusable as a witness.110 There are powerful
institutional pressures against making such a finding.111
There are good reasons why mistakes may arise from people trying
in good faith to recount their perceptions in the stress and heat of the
moment.112 People recalling events in conscious good faith may have
perceptions unwittingly skewed by confirmation, hindsight, and
outcome biases.113 Yet faced with deeply divergent stories and no other
way to reconstruct the event, courts have difficulty spotting and
supporting findings of potential mistakes in perception.114
Increasingly, criminal procedure doctrine has developed a phalanx
of rules that reduce the need to have to delve into competing
accounts.115 One of the most oft-reiterated positions in constitutional
criminal procedure is that courts will not delve into pretext or
subjective intent so long as an objective basis exists to justify the
officer’s conduct.116 Even where an officer’s stated rationale for a
search or seizure is incorrect, so long as another basis to justify the
exercise of power can be found, the court will inquire no further.117
Among the oft-stated rationales for the limits on judicial inquiry are
the administrative difficulties and inefficiencies of case-by-case inquiry
into the mystery of police motives.118
110 Cf. Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1341, 1352 (1996); see Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do
About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1043-47 (1996).
111 Slobogin, supra note 110.
112 See discussion in text and sources cited supra notes 86–102.
113 See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
114 See, e.g., Fuzzard v. State, 13 P.3d 1163, 1165-67 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(discussing difficulties posed by conflicting witness and defendant accounts in the
context of domestic violence cases); People v. Naylor, 893 N.E.2d 653, 668 (Ill. 2008)
(finding that the trial court committed reversible error when, “the trial court was
faced with two different versions of events, both of which were credible” and decided
to believe the officers over the defendant based on erroneously admitted evidence
used to impeach the defendant); State v. Mangrum, 403 S.W.3d 152, 167 (Tenn.
2013) (discussing difficulty determining the proper charges because of conflicting
accounts).
115 For a discussion, see Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in
Criminal Procedure, 44 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1407, 1421-26 (2011).
116 See e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007); Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 363 (2001);
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 220-21, 235 n.1 (1973).
117 See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536-40 (2014); Devenpeck, 543
U.S. at 153-54.
118 E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1978); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
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The consequences of judicial reluctance to inquire for
socioeconomically disadvantaged minority communities bearing the
heaviest burden of searches and seizures are intensely controversial.119
Scholars have argued that cases such as Whren v. United States, which
declined to inquire into whether a stop for a minor offense was
actually a pretext to target young black men for a search, create “a
license to make racial distinctions.”120 Recently, Devon Carbado has
argued that the tolerance of racial profiling in constitutional criminal
procedure is a contributing cause of the heightened risk of minority
community members being killed by the police.121 The lack of scrutiny
or a remedy undermines trust and perceptions of legitimacy, and can
lead to what Bennet Capers terms “small rebellions.”122 And, as
discussed in the next section, trust may become so eroded that
interests may shift and converge toward a paradigm shift in police
regulation with important implications for how courts adjudicate
criminal procedure questions.
B. Odd Bedfellows Converge in Interests on Cameras
No one likes being the object of surveillance — and that includes
the masters of surveillance, the police.123 Historically, police
departments resisted recording even a portion of their work —
interrogations — because of concerns that videotaping would be
costly, prevent suspects from talking, and reveal strategies that might
be unpalatable to judges and juries.124 In recent years, as more
119

For critiques see, for example, DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 27-41, 48-52 (1999); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race
and Place, 44 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 43, 56-72 (2009); Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F.
Moran, The Story of Law and American Racial Consciousness: Building a Canon One Case
at a Time, 76 UMKC L. REV. 851, 873-74 (2008).
120 Carbado & Moran, supra note 119, at 873-74.
121 Devon W. Carbado, The Legalization of Racial Profiling: Setting the Stage for
Police Violence (Feb. 18, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
122 I. Bennet Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 865 (2008).
123 See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The
Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability
and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619, 629 (2004) (discussing debate
over the need for police privacy in interrogation and the concern that opening up the
interrogation to public scrutiny would cripple the power to obtain confessions);
Richard A. Leo & Kimberly D. Richman, Mandate the Electronic Recording of Police
Interrogations, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 791, 792 (2007) (noting that many police
departments continue to resist recording interrogations though electronic recording
has become increasingly common).
124 WILLIAM A. GELLER, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VIDEOTAPING INTERROGATIONS AND
CONFESSIONS 3, 6 (1993); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A
IN THE
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investigators have gained experience with recording suspect
interviews, there has been a shift toward appreciating the benefits of
recording interrogations.125 Because of a combination of legislation,
judicial and prosecutorial encouragement, and voluntary departmental
action, more than half of law enforcement agencies now record at least
some interrogations, according to estimates.126
Putting body cameras on officers is much more pervasive and
intrusive because a wider range of officer conduct and much more of
an officer’s day are recorded.127 The logic of regulation by body camera
resembles the brilliance of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon idea — get
people to behave because an eye could be on them at any time.128 The
problem is that the Panopticon was an idea for a prison.129 Nonprisoners are likely to resist.
Officers, police unions, and civil liberties groups have expressed
concerns over body cameras such as chilling communications with
witnesses and victims and trampling the privacy of the public and
officers.130 People face having their most painful, stressful and
embarrassing moments preserved for replay when law enforcement
encounters are recorded.131 Public disclosure laws also pose the risk
that such painful and embarrassing videos may be ordered disclosed to
individuals who may even post the video on YouTube or some other
public platform for consumption.132
A July 2013 study of a sample of 254 police departments across the
United States found that less than a quarter of the responding
Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 385
(2007).
125 See Kassin et al., supra note 124, at 396.
126 See Lassiter et al., Camera Perspective Bias, supra note 22, at 54; Thomas P.
Sullivan, Recording Federal Custodial Interviews, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1297, 1311-12
(2008).
127 For the results of our study of body camera policy provisions on what police
actions must be recorded see infra Part II.
128 See Miran Božovič, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS
13-18 (Miran Božovič ed., 1995) (explaining Bentham’s idea of the Panopticon, which
would enable more efficient and effective governance of prison inmates by creating a
structure that permitted the perfect visibility of prisoners arrayed around an opaque
watchtower).
129 See id. at 8.
130 See, e.g., Douglas Hanks, For Police Cameras, Going Dark Can Be a Challenge,
MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/
miami-dade/article4480249.html (discussing concerns among officers, including
recording community members on some of the worst days of their lives).
131 Fan, Police Body Cameras, supra note 20, at 397-409.
132 Id. at 397-98, 404-06.
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departments used body cameras.133 Then came what the executive
director of the organization representing rank-and-file police officers
calls “a watershed moment in policing” — the national turmoil over
the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson.134 Witnesses offered
polarized and dramatically divergent accounts of what happened.135
Some witnesses said Officer Darren Wilson punched and shot Brown
in the back even though Brown held his hands up in surrender.136 In
an account supported by some other witnesses, Wilson said Brown
punched him, tried to grab his gun, then ran away, but turned to
charge him when Wilson pursued him and Wilson shot in fear for his
life.137 It was another deeply divergent painful credibility contest —
with no camera recording the key events to show what unfolded.138
One of the biggest reforms associated with the Ferguson turmoil are
body cameras for police officers.139 Protests erupted after a grand jury
refused to indict Wilson, drawing national and international attention
to the heightened risk of being killed by the police that black men in
America face.140 Seven months later, the U.S. Department of Justice
133 POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING A BODYWORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2014),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/472014912134715246869.pdf.
134 Sandhya Somashekhar, Wesley Lowery, Keith L. Alexander, Kimberly Kindy &
Julie Tate, Black and Unarmed, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/08/08/black-and-unarmed/.
135 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO
THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER
DARREN WILSON 6-8 (Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter BROWN DEATH INVESTIGATION REPORT],
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf (summarizing conflicting witness
accounts about what happened); Frances Robles & Michael S. Schmidt, Shooting
Accounts Differ as Holder Schedules Visit to Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2014, at A1
(reporting on divergent witness accounts).
136 See BROWN DEATH INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 135, at 7-8.
137 See id. at 6-8; Robles & Schmidt, supra note 135, at A1.
138 Sanburn, supra note 16.
139 Ehrenfreund, supra note 16; see Sanburn, supra note 16.
140 Monica Davey & Julia Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not
Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, at A1; Brianna Lee & Michelle Florcruz, Ferguson,
Missouri, Protests: International Newspapers, Media Showcase Violence, Destruction,
Flames, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/ferguson-missouriprotests-international-newspapers-media-showcase-violence-1729216; Jill Reilly,
Louise Boyle, Ashley Collman, David Martokso & Dan Bates, Ferguson Burns, DAILY
MAIL (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2844491/FergusonMissouri-Police-officer-Darren-Wilson-NOT-face-charges-shooting-unarmed-blackteen-Michael-Brown.html; Jon Swaine, Oliver Laughland, Jamiles Lartey & Ciara
McCarthy, Young Black Men Killed by US Police at Highest Rate in Year of 1,134 Deaths,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/31/the-
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would conclude that forensic evidence was inconsistent with claims
that Brown was shot in the back with his hands up in surrender.141 But
by then, police had realized that public support and trust was turning
sharply against law enforcement officers.142
Several police departments had been considering or piloting a shift
to police body cameras before, but Ferguson provided a compelling
push.143 Proponents of body cameras frequently point with hope to
studies indicating that deploying body cameras reduces the frequency
of complaints against officers and uses of force by officers.144 Trustbuilding and protection is an oft-stated rationale for adopting body
cameras.145 Advocates of adopting body cameras also argue that
officers and the public behave better when they know they are being

counted-police-killings-2015-young-black-men.
141 See BROWN DEATH INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 135, at 7-8; Somashekhar
et al., supra note 134.
142 Somashekhar et al., supra note 134.
143 See, e.g., Michael Blasky, Conduct on Camera, U. NEV., LAS VEGAS (Mar. 11,
2015), https://www.unlv.edu/news/article/conduct-camera (reporting findings that
officers initially skeptical of body cameras changed their views after Ferguson because
they realized that wearing a camera might help exonerate them); William Crum,
Oklahoma City Police Take ‘Huge Step’ Toward Body Cameras for Officers, OKLAHOMAN
(Sept. 5, 2015), http://newsok.com/article/5444779 (noting the department had been
considering whether to adopt body cameras but Ferguson spurred action).
144 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 133, at 5-6; EUGENE P. RAMIREZ, A
REPORT ON BODY WORN CAMERAS 3-4 (2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/14005_Report_BODY_WORN_CAMERAS.pdf; MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODYWORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 20 (2014), https://ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/
sites/default/files/spotlight/download/Police%20Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf.
145 See, e.g., DC BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM REGULATIONS AMENDMENT ACT OF
2015, § 3900.2 (“The intent of the BWC program is to promote the public trust,
enhance service to the community by accurately documenting events and any
interactions and statements made during encounters between MPD officers and the
public, and ensure the safety of both MPD officers and the public.”); PHILA. POLICE
DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 4.21, at § 1.A.2 (2015) (effective Apr. 20, 2015); SAN DIEGO POLICE
DEP’T PROCEDURE NO. 1.49, at 1 (2015) (“Cameras provide additional documentation
of police/public encounters and may be an important tool for collecting evidence and
maintaining public trust.”); S.F. POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS POLICY,
Recommended Draft, at 1 (2015) (on file with author) (“The use of Body Worn
Cameras (BWC) is an effective tool a law enforcement agency can use to demonstrate
its commitment to transparency, ensure the accountability of its members, increase
the public’s trust in officers, and protect its members from unjustified complaints of
misconduct.”).
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recorded.146 Proponents also believe that recording events reduces
unfounded complaints.147
The first and most frequently cited scientific evidence for the
benefits of body cameras comes from a study that randomly assigned
half of the fifty-four officers of the Rialto, California police department
to wearing body cameras.148 During the study period, officers without
body cameras had twice the incidence of uses of force compared to the
group using body cameras.149 The between-groups difference in
complaints was not statistically significant largely due to the low
number of complaints against either group in the small department
and community.150 However, comparing the number of complaints
during the body camera study period to those before body cameras
were implemented indicated a significant reduction in the number of
complaints of more than 90%.151 A later study of the Phoenix, Arizona
Police Department found that complaints against officers in a precinct
deploying body cameras declined by 22.5%, during a period in which
complaints against officers in other comparable precincts without
body cameras rose.152 A study of Mesa, Arizona police officers also
found a reduction in complaints against officers wearing body
cameras.153 The San Diego police department also reported a reduction
in uses of force and complaints against police deploying body
cameras.154 Other studies are ongoing.155
Groups that often take opposing positions on policing and
surveillance debates have united to usher in an era of rapid transition
to body cameras.156 Galvanized by the events in Ferguson, major civil
146 See POLICE COMPLAINTS BD., supra note 49, at 3; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM,
supra note 133, at 6.
147 POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 133, at 6.
148 See Barak Ariel, William A. Farrar & Alex Sutherland, The Effect of Police BodyWorn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A
Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 518-19 (2015).
149 Id. at 523.
150 Id. at 524.
151 Id.
152 CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER WORN BODY
CAMERAS IN THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 33 (2014), https://publicservice.asu.edu/
sites/default/files/ppd_spi_feb_20_2015_final.pdf.
153 WHITE, supra note 144, at 21-22.
154 SAN DIEGO CITY COUNCIL ACTION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SHEET: SDPD BODY WORN
CAMERA PROGRAM, 10-11 (2015), http://docs.sandiego.gov/councilcomm_agendas_
attach/2015/psln_150318_2.pdf.
155 See, e.g., Blasky, supra note 143.
156 See, e.g., Civil Rights Coalition Urges National Reforms and Recommendations to
Address Police Abuse, NAACP (2015), http://www.naacp.org/news/entry/civil-rights-
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rights and civil liberties groups united to call for the required use of
body cameras and other reforms.157 Even the ACLU, which has a track
record of opposing extending surveillance and strong concern for
privacy, joined the call for putting body cameras on the police.158 Civil
rights and civil liberties groups supported body cameras as a way to
police the police, promote greater transparency, and reduce the risk of
injuries and deaths in law enforcement encounters.159
Also motivated by the events in Ferguson, police departments began
to see the benefits of body cameras.160 Police chiefs who might been
reluctant five years ago to adopt body cameras realized their utility in
offering evidence of what happened, re-building trust, and reducing
unfounded complaints.161 A recent study of officer perceptions of body
cameras, based on surveys of Orlando police officers, also found a
widespread belief that recording might improve the behavior of the
public toward officers.162 Officers who were previously skeptical of
body cameras are also realizing that body cameras can help exonerate
them if they are falsely accused of wrongdoing.163
coalition-urges-national-reforms-and-recommendations-to-addres
(urging
the
adoption of body cameras); Mike Maciag, Survey: Almost All Police Departments Plan to
Use Body Cameras, GOVERNING (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/
public-justice-safety/gov-police-body-camera-survey.html (reporting on the plans of
police departments across the United States to deploy body cameras).
157 LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW ET AL., A UNIFIED STATEMENT OF
ACTION TO PROMOTE REFORM AND STOP POLICE ABUSE 1-3 (Aug. 18, 2014),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/black_leaders_joint_statement_-_final__8-18.pdf.
158 See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW ET AL., supra note 157; Jay
Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, a Win for
All, ACLU (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/police-bodymounted-cameras-right-policies-place-win-all.
159 See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW ET AL., supra note 157.
160 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 133, at 7 (reporting on
changing perceptions); Mara H. Gottfried, St. Paul Police to Get Body Cameras, Explain
Details at Community Meetings, PIONEER PRESS (Oct. 19, 2015, 11:01 PM),
http://www.twincities.com/2015/10/19/st-paul-police-to-get-body-cameras-explaindetails-at-community-meetings/ (reporting on shifts in police opinion).
161 E.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 133, at 6; Gottfried, supra note
160 (quoting Andy Skoogman, Executive Director of Police Chiefs Association).
162 Wesley G. Jennings, Lorie A. Fridell & Mathew D. Lynch, Cops and Cameras:
Officer Perceptions of the Use of Body-Worn Cameras in Law Enforcement, 42 J. CRIM.
JUST. 549, 552 (2014).
163 See POLICE COMPLAINTS BD., supra note 49, at 3-4; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH
FORUM, supra note 133, at 6-7; see also, e.g., AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T, supra note 24
(stating that body-worn cameras can help protect against false allegations of
misconduct); CHI. POLICE DEP’T, SPECIAL ORDER S03-14 (2015) (effective Jan. 1, 2016)
(stating that body-worn cameras “can protect members from false accusations through
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Body cameras offer a powerful example of Derrick Bell’s interestconvergence thesis that progress for the powerless occurs when the
reform converges with the interests of the powerful.164 Police
departments across the nation have announced plans to adopt body
cameras, resulting in a surge of sales of police-worn body cameras.165
Stock prices surged for Taser International, maker of one of the most
popular brands of body cameras and a cloud-based service to store the
footage, and other companies in the body camera business.166 A recent
survey by the Major Cities Chiefs Association and Major County
Sheriffs’ Association found that 95% of 70 law enforcement agencies
surveyed have either committed to putting body cameras on officers or
have already done so.167 The convergence of diverse interests across
unusual bedfellows has thus created a major shift in the recording of
police encounters in the United States.

the objective documentation of interactions between Department members and the
public”); Doug Wyllie, Survey: Police Officers Want Body-Worn Cameras, POLICEONE
(Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/
6017774-Survey-Police-officers-want-body-worn-cameras/ (reporting the results of a
survey, sponsored in part by a maker of body cameras, finding that 85% of the 785
respondents “believe that body-worn cameras reduce false claims of police
misconduct, and reduce the likelihood of litigation against the agency”).
164 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
165 Alan Gomez, After Ferguson, Police Rush to Buy Body Cameras, USA TODAY (Oct. 11,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/11/police-body-camerasferguson-privacy-concerns/16587679/.
166 James DeTar, Taser, Digital Ally Stocks Helped by Ferguson Unrest, INVESTOR’S
BUS. DAILY, Aug. 21, 2014, 2014 WLNR 23081989; Jeff Stone, Getting Past the ‘Don’t
Taze Me Bro!’ Stigma: Building Relationships with Cops Is Paying off for Taser, Which
Sees Police Body Cameras as a Way to Reinvent Itself, INT’L BUS. TIMES NEWS, Dec. 5,
2014, 2014 WLNR 34496372; TASER International Continues to Climb on Ferguson
Unrest; Shares Jump 10% to 11-Week High, MIDNIGHT TRADER, Aug. 18, 2014, 2014
WLNR 22672056; Zacks Research Staff, After Ferguson, Is TASER’s Stock Price Surge
Justified?, ZACKS INV. RES., Aug. 20, 2014, 2014 WLNR 22813921.
167 Maciag, supra note 156.
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THE FUTURE WILL BE RECORDED
Body camera footage of
police officers responding to
calls about loud yelling in an
apartment from someone
who may be mentally ill.
Officers are engaging in a
knock and talk consensual
encounter with the subject
of the complaints.

The spurt of police body cameras hitting the streets presents
important policy questions about what will be recorded or not, public
disclosure, privacy, and witness protection.168 Many state legislatures
are considering bills to help answer the host of questions raised by
putting hundreds or thousands of cameras into the community on
police.169 A small but growing number of legislatures have succeeded
in passing legislation to provide some guidelines for the police
departments and communities in their state.170 Legislators in other
jurisdictions are wrestling with disagreements over police discretion,
privacy protection, and public disclosure.171 Even though a historic
168 See, e.g., Developments in the Law, Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1794, 1805-08 (2015) (noting the numerous important open policy questions
about body cameras).
169 See, e.g., Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Lawmakers Focus on Police BodyWorn Cameras (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2015/08/05/lawmakers-focuson-police-body-worn-cameras.aspx (noting that at least 37 states as of August 2015
had considered body-worn camera legislation); see also, e.g., Jeremy Brilliant, Bill
Would Keep Most Police Body Cam Video Secret, WTHR 13 (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://www.wthr.com/story/31014061/indiana-bill-would-give-police-departmentsoption-of-not-releasing-video-footage (reporting on pending legislation in Indiana to
exempt body camera footage from public disclosure to protect privacy).
170 See, e.g., CONN. STAT. ANN. § 29-6d(g) (2016) (specifying circumstances when
recording by body-worn cameras is prohibited); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480.365
(2016) (giving agencies guidance on when portable recording devices must be
activated or deactivated); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540 (2016) (prescribing limits on
recording vis body camera); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240 (2016) (prescribing body
camera guidelines for South Carolina law enforcement agencies); TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 411.441-48 (2016) (prescribing recording policies); Gen. Assemb. 1304, art. 10,
99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2015) (effective Jan. 1, 2016) (providing guidelines on
recording).
171 See, e.g., Rachel Alexander, Body Camera Clarity Sought: Bills Seek to Balance
Rights of Individuals, Public, SPOKESMAN-REV., Feb. 19, 2015, 2015 WLNR 5052803
(describing competing bills and perspectives); Barbara Rodriguez, Bills on Body
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convergence of interest ushered in the body camera era, the groups
come from very different perspectives on police discretion, privacy
and how the public is best protected.172
In the absence of legislatively prescribed rules, or based on
delegations of power to frame specific policies, many police
departments have taken the lead in drafting policies on body-worn
cameras addressing the important questions.173 The policies vary in
communities across the United States.174 This section reports findings
from the first study to code and analyze the available body camera
policies among police departments serving the 100 largest cities in the
United States.175 The policies collected and coded were those
obtainable as of December 2015. The results reported in this article
focus on policies regarding what activities police must record.176
While there is heterogeneity in departmental requirements, the results
reveal a coming future where most law enforcement encounters —
including some of the most opaque domains of criminal procedure —
will be illuminated. The hundreds of thousands of hours of footage
will be linked to the police reports that land on lawyers’ desks to start
a criminal case, offering litigants a rich source of evidence for
introduction and courts greater power than ever before to replay
events in contested criminal procedure contexts.177
A. Body Camera Policies on What Must Be Recorded
The police body camera revolution implicates some of the greatest
dilemmas of modern organized society, including how much
Cameras in Iowa Showcase Looming Challenges, DES MOINES REG. (Feb. 21, 2016),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2016/02/21/bills-body-camerasiowa-showcase-looming-challenges/80708172/ (reporting on heated debate over how
to protect privacy); Dennis Romboy, Legislators Wrestling with Police Body Cam Laws,
DESERET NEWS, Feb. 18, 2016, 2016 WLNR 5050778 (discussing major disagreements
over minimum standards for police use of body cameras and questions about personal
privacy).
172 See, e.g., Tanzina Vega, Rights Groups: Police Use of Body Cameras Raises Privacy
Concerns, CNN (May 15, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/15/politics/bodycameras-civil-rights-privacy-coalition/ (discussing policy disagreements).
173 See examples of body camera policies cited supra notes 24, 26.
174 See discussion infra Part II.A and summaries in Tables 1, 2.
175 As discussed, infra, Part II, not all municipal police departments have adopted
body cameras, or have formulated or made available body camera policies yet. We
therefore coded the policies from the jurisdictions listed in Appendix 1.
176 Findings from the portion of this empirical study dealing with privacy policies
are reported separately in another project focused on privacy questions.
177 See discussion infra Part II.B.
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discretion to accord the police and the right balance between
surveillance and privacy. Because the law often lags behind technology
in policing, departments across the nation have had to take the first
pass at crafting policies that address important questions of privacy,
police discretion and public safety.178 To shed light on the future that
is emerging, this study collected and coded body camera policies
issued by police departments serving the 100 largest cities in the
United States as of December 2015.
Data collection focused on municipal police departments, because
the scope of work and municipal coverage is generally broadest with
these primary agencies compared to other specialized agencies that
may also serve the region.179 Examining the 100 largest cities offered
diversity of region and city size while still focusing on areas where
more people will be affected. The cities ranged in size from more than
8.4 million people in New York, to places with less than 250,000 such
as Fremont, California or Chesapeake, Virginia.180 While smaller
jurisdictions such as Rialto, Ferguson, and Spokane are also deploying
body cameras, this study focused on the largest cities because their
policies impact the most people and can set the standards for others to
emulate.181 These cities also generate the largest volume of business
for the increasingly lucrative body camera hardware and software
industry.182
A team of eight persons investigated the body camera adoption
status of each jurisdiction. If the city had plans to adopt body cameras
or had deployed them, the investigators sought a copy of the body
camera policy and coded the policies as well as the proffered reasons
for adopting body cameras.183 Through an iterative process based on
178

See examples of body camera policies cited supra notes 24, 26.
See, e.g., David N. Falcone & L. Edward Wells, The County Sheriff as A
Distinctive Policing Modality, 14 AM. J. POLICE 123, 123-25 (1995) (discussing the
different agencies that may serve a region and their respective scopes of work).
180 See The Largest US Cities: Cities Ranked 1 to 100, CITY MAYORS,
http://www.citymayors.com/gratis/uscities_100.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); Top
100 Metropolitan Areas – Ranked by Population, 2014 Estimates, BARUCH COLL. (July 1,
2014), http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/nycdata/world_cities/largest_cities-usa.htm; Top
100 Biggest Cities, CITY-DATA, http://www.city-data.com/top1.html (last visited Feb.
18, 2016).
181 See, e.g., Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion,
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840, 840-51 (2008) (discussing mechanisms of policy diffusion by
emulation).
182 See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, The Big Money in Police Body Cameras, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/the-bigmoney-in-police-body-cameras/392009/ (discussing lucrative technology contracts).
183 The Brennan Center and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press offer
179
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review of the scope of issues and positions covered by the body
camera policies, we generated a policy codebook with 51 variables.
The variables covered issues such as the extent of officer discretion
regarding what to record, what types of situations must be recorded,
when recording must stop, public and officer access to recordings and
data retention, redaction and storage issues.
Table 1 summarizes the status of body camera adoption in the 100
municipal departments examined. The vast majority of the police
departments examined — 88 out of 100 — have piloted or used police
body cameras or have plans to do so. Of those, the great majority —
69 out of the 88 —launched or will launch body cameras in 2014 or
later, showing the very recent nature of the major shift.
Table 1. Body Camera Adoption Status among Police Departments in
the 100 Largest U.S. Cities
Body Camera Adoption Status
Does not use officer-worn body cameras
Has piloted or is piloting the use of body cameras
Plans to pilot or use body cameras in the future
Extending body camera use throughout force

Number of
Departments
12
36
24
28

Among those 88 departments that have used or plan to use body
cameras, 39 had publicly available body camera policies. In addition,
three departments were in states that had enacted body camera
legislation that gives some guidelines about recording policy. The final
sample for coding was therefore 42 — just under half of the police
departments that either are considering using body cameras or have
piloted or deployed them.
Among the departments with available laws and policies for coding,
the most popular model of police recording discretion is a limited
discretion model. Under a limited discretion model, police are directed
to record specified enforcement activities and given discretion over
whether to record at other times.184 The vast majority of the available
excellent resources for linking researchers to body camera policies. See Police Body
Camera Policies, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.
brennancenter.org/body-cam-city-map; Access to Police Body-Worn Camera Video,
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/bodycams (last visited
Feb. 20, 2016). We searched these and other department-specific sites and where
policies could not be located, we contacted individual departments.
184 See, e.g., N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR
THE NYPD, BODY-WORN CAMERAS IN NYC: AN ASSESSMENT OF NYPD’S PILOT PROGRAM
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policies — 34 out of 42 — spell out a limited discretion model. The
remaining eight departmental policies coded have adopted a highly
limited discretion model requiring that body cameras be on during all
enforcement encounters with the public, unless an exception applies.
Table 2 lists enforcement events and the number of departments
among the 42 coded that require recording of the event. The
enforcement events are listed by order of frequency of specification in
policies requiring recording. Nearly all the departments mandate
recording of Terry and traffic stops, searches, arrests, pursuits, and
responses to calls for service. Most require the recording of use of
force or encounters that escalate, becoming adversarial. In light of the
controversy over the death of Freddie Gray during transportation
while in custody, it is also notable that most of the policies mandate
recordings of transportation of suspects in custody.185
Table 2. Events to be Recorded According to the 42 Publicly Available
Body Camera Recording Policies and Laws Coded186
Enforcement Activity
Terry stops
Traffic stops
Arrests
Pursuits, foot or traffic
Responding to calls for service
Searches
Encounters that escalate or get
adversarial
Use of force
Transporting persons in custody
Minor crimes/infraction
enforcement
Consensual encounters

Mandatory:
Number of
Departments
39
39
39
38
36
36
34

Discretionary:
Number of
Departments
1
1
0
0
1
0
2

34
33
31

1
1
0

11

17

AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY ii (2015), http://www.nyc.gov/
html/oignypd/assets/downloads/pdf/nypd-body-camera-report.pdf (defining a limited
discretion model).
185 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jess Bidgood, Starkly Different Accounts of
Freddie Gray’s Death as Trial of Officer Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2015, at A20
(discussing the controversy and mystery over Freddie Gray’s death while being
transported in custody).
186 The numbers in the right-most two columns may not add up to 42 because
some policies may not specify a position on the issue.
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What is not as consistently mandated is the recording of consensual
encounters. In criminal procedure and police parlance, a consensual
encounter is the initiation of an encounter by an officer, typically in
situations where there is either no articulable basis yet for reasonable
suspicion or it is unclear if there is a sufficient basis.187 Consensual
encounters are unregulated by the Fourth Amendment because they
are not deemed a seizure.188 Targeting for a consensual encounter is
intensely controversial because of the lack of regulation or scrutiny.189
Given the tendency of people to comply when approached by police
officers, the consensual part of a “consensual encounter” can resemble
a legal fiction.190 Because the selection of persons for consensual
encounters is unregulated, the risk of targeting due to hunches based
on a person’s race, gender, age and socioeconomic background is
heightened.191
Recording consensual encounters is an important step toward
illuminating a controversial and opaque domain. Given the
unregulated and controversial nature of consensual encounters,
perhaps what is more remarkable is that nearly half of the departments
187 See, e.g., United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 352 (6th Cir. 1997) (describing
the unregulated nature of consensual encounters, “which may be initiated without any
objective level of suspicion”).
188 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-36 (1991) (“Our cases make it
clear that a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an
individual and asks a few questions. . . . The encounter will not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature.”); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (“The initial contact between the officers and respondent, where
they simply asked if he would step aside and talk with them, was clearly the sort of
consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest.”).
189 See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship,
and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REV. 1, 40 (2011) (discussing
controversies due to racial biases).
190 See, e.g., Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of
Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156 (“[T]he Court’s Fourth Amendment consent
jurisprudence is either based on serious errors about human behavior and judgment,
or else has devolved into a legal fiction of the crudest sort—a mere device for attaining
the desired legal consequence.”).
191 See, e.g., Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to Comply:
Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483,
1486 (2007) (“Police are free to initiate a consensual encounter with an individual for
any reason or no reason, perhaps based on a whim or a “hunch” that cannot be
supported by specific and articulable facts.”); Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line
Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth
Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 509 (2001)
(“Requiring no objective indication of criminality, a consensual encounter can be
initiated for no reason or for any reason at all, including the kind of inchoate hunches
and suspicions disallowed even for stops, the least intrusive form of seizure.”)
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with policies coded mandate the recording of consensual encounters.
Well over half either provide for discretionary or mandatory recording
of such encounters. While a good step forward, wider-spread
mandating that consensual encounters be recorded would better serve
the goals of increasing trust and transparency that are oft-stated in
body camera policies.
The early movers in framing body camera recording policies play an
important role as exemplars for other jurisdictions joining the body
camera bandwagon.192 The body camera policies are also exemplars for
legislatures about what policies are feasible and already deployed in
the field.193 When it comes to new technology, courts and legislatures
often trail behind practice, and may end up accepting or adjusting the
practice that has been forged in the field.194 Examining the early and
major jurisdiction movers in forging body camera recording policy
reveals a future where many of the main staples of criminal procedure
— stops, searches, arrests, responses to calls for service, uses of force,
and even the enforcement of minor crimes or infractions — will be
recorded. Indeed, there appears to be much more consensus about
required recording of enforcement encounters than the private and
sensitive contexts that should not be captured on camera.
B. The Coming Replay Power: Bigger and Better than Before
The recording of the main staple events contested in criminal
procedure law has important implications for lawyers and courts as
well as the police. The nature of the evidence and information
available to reconstruct events will powerfully change. Currently,
when a new case lands in the hands of a prosecutor or defense
attorney, the police report is often the first guide to the attorneys on
both sides to figure out what the case about.195 The police report also

192 See, e.g., Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, Innovation and Diffusion
Models in Policy Research, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 307, 310-27 (Paul A.
Sabatier & Christopher M. Weible eds., 3d ed. 2014) (discussing models of emulation,
early and late adoption); Jill Clark, Policy Diffusion and Program Scope: Research
Directions, 15 PUBLIUS 61 (1985) (discussing leaders and laggards in policy diffusion).
193 See, e.g., Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1174 (1973) (offering a model of diffusion).
194 Cf. Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 539-42 (2011) (discussing the benefits of judicial delay when it
comes to new technologies in law enforcement).
195 See, e.g., Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 82, at 1240-41 (discussing how
overburdened attorneys often first get to know what the case is about through the
police report contained in a thin file).
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guides later officer testimony because officers rely on their reports to
refresh their memory when they testify after the event.196 Indeed,
before testifying, officers often read their police reports in the
courthouse hallways to revive memories blurred by time and
numerous other encounters.197 Particularly in run-of-the-mill cases,
officer testimony is often limited to what is in the report.198
The report that has such power in framing a criminal case from its
inception is limited by its one-dimensional nature, committed to paper
as a summary of the perceptions of the officer involved. As the
Simmons case study at the outset of Part I illustrates, this perspective
is driven by what is of evidentiary value to the government.199 Many
details do not make it into the report, which is necessarily a summary
focused on justifying the enforcement action and documenting the
evidence obtained from it.200
In jurisdictions where officers use body cameras, this thin paper
account is supplemented by multimedia capturing a fuller range of
details from a broader perspective. Most of the departmental policies
coded in this study explicitly specify that police reports must note that
there is accompanying video of the incident.201 Defendants may also
request disclosure of the video in discovery.202 This video can speak
beyond officer accounts at suppression hearings even when the
defendant does not speak. The availability of video thus can address
the challenges of a criminal justice system where one party to disputed
events is repeatedly advised to stay silent.203
196 Darren T. Kavinoky, Knowledge as the Foundation, in STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING
DUI CASES IN CALIFORNIA (Aspatore ed., 2008), 2008 WL 5689409, at *11.
197 See id. (“We see them in the hallways, reading those reports and trying to
refresh their recollection.”).
198 See id. (“There is usually a significant lag time between the time the person is
arrested and the time the case goes to trial. During that time, the officer has forgotten
that client and the specific details . . . so we know when the officers get on the stand
that they will testify to what is included in the police report—no more and no less.”).
199 See discussion supra notes 52–63.
200 See, e.g., People v. Ellis, No. 1–10–3661, 2012 WL 6861254, at *15 (Ill. App.
Ct. Dec. 28, 2012) (noting that a police report is a summary and may omit some
information).
201 Specifically, 31 out of the 42 body camera policies coded specify linkage
between the report and the video.
202 See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963) (requiring disclosure of
evidence favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment); James W.
McGee, Jr., DWI Discovery Trends in North Carolina, TRENDS IN DUI DISCOVERY, Sept.
2015, at 81, 82 (noting that as a defense attorney in a jurisdiction with dash cameras
and body cameras, he always makes a Brady request for the videotape).
203 See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
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The availability of video will also influence officer report-writing
and testimony. Most of the jurisdictions coded explicitly state that the
officer can review the body camera video in preparation for testimony
and while writing reports. Indeed some departments require review of
the video in preparing to testify.204 None of the policies limit officer
review of the body camera video in preparing to testify. Where policies
are silent, officers are free to review the body camera video in
preparation to testify and competent officers and prosecutors will
review that video in preparation for court.
Through introduction and dispute by the parties, courts will also
have access to the video of contested encounters. The availability of
video generates for the courts a power to replay events to help
reconstruct what happened rather than depend on partisan and often
one-sided testimony. The audiovisual recording of a wider array of law
enforcement activities than ever before is a major development for
courts adjudicating criminal cases. The event replay power will also be
greater than ever before.
To date, courts tend to have video access to only a small portion of
the contested law enforcement encounters they adjudicate. Most of the
progress on recording has occurred in the context of police
interrogations, which more than half of U.S. jurisdictions now
record.205 But much of the evidence — and in some cases, the entire
basis for prosecution — may come from searches and seizures or
observations during police encounters in the non-interrogation
context. Before body cameras, the main video window courts had into
the search and seizure disputed in criminal procedure cases was
through dash cameras.206 These dash camera videos yield only partial
snapshots, often from a distant angle that misses important details.207
Even in traffic stops, a dash camera does not capture the relevant
details of what might give police probable cause for a search of the
vehicle or an arrest of the person inside it. Compare for instance, the
204 See, e.g., Memorandum from T. Armstrong, Dir., Memphis Police Department to
All Personnel (Sept. 23, 2015) (requiring that officers review body-worn camera
footage before writing reports); Memorandum from Operational Support, San Diego
Police Department 11 (July 8, 2015) (requiring that officers review digital evidence
before completing reports to prime their recollection but “shall not write their reports
based solely on what they viewed from the BWC recording”).
205 See, e.g., Lassiter et al., Camera Perspective Bias, supra note 22, at 154 (citing
estimates).
206 See, e.g., State v. O’Neal, 7 So. 3d 182, 185 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (noting use of
dash camera footage at suppression hearing); State v. Munsey, 424 S.W.3d 767, 769
(Tex. Ct. App. 2014).
207 See discussion and video example supra notes 26–27.
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two stills below from video of the same traffic stop.208 The still on the
left is from the patrol vehicle dash camera.209 The still on the right is
from the officer’s body camera.210

View from patrol vehicle dash camera

View from officer-worn body
camera

Now imagine if this traffic stop had been the one in Michael
Whren’s case.211 Recall that in Whren v. United States, the Court
recounts that when the officer decided to pull over Whren and his
friend James Brown in their Pathfinder vehicle for minor traffic
infractions, this occurred:
The policemen followed, and in a short while overtook the
Pathfinder when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light.
They pulled up alongside, and Officer Ephraim Soto stepped
out and approached the driver’s door, identifying himself as a
police officer and directing the driver, petitioner Brown, to put
the vehicle in park. When Soto drew up to the driver’s
window, he immediately observed two large plastic bags of

208 Sterling Police Dep’t, The Difference a Camera Can Make, YOUTUBE (Sept. 12,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXy17SIzpbQ.
209 Id. at 1:00.
210 Id. at 2:30.
211 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808-09 (1996).
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what appeared to be crack cocaine in petitioner Whren’s
hands.212
Let’s return to the question in Part I.A.1.213 Why were the two large
plastic bags sitting boldly in plain view in Whren’s hands when Whren
and Brown knew officers had been tailing them and were nervous
enough to try to drive sharply away?214 The question has vexed
scholars who have suggested that the facts in Whren are an example of
testilying — telling a more legally palatable tale to avoid suppression
of the evidence — that the Court ignores.215 Yet, without the
defendant’s testimony offering a contrary story at the suppression
hearing, nor video, there is not much a court can do. The evidence in
the record is the officers’ testimony. As the still photos above indicate,
even if the officers in Whren’s case had dash camera footage, it would
not tell the lawyers or the court much. We cannot see what was in
Whren’s lap. But the body camera footage would give the court much
greater ability to replay the stop and check the story — and perhaps
view the stop from a different perspective that includes a lap view —
even if the defendant does not speak.
III. RULES OF USE AND RESTRAINT FOR THE JUDICIAL POWER TO REPLAY
The body camera revolution is also an evidentiary revolution. It may
enable judges to see for themselves more of what occurred, beyond the
partiality, perceptual frailties, and gaps of oral or written statements.
Throughout American history, images have powerfully communicated
calls for change.216 It takes seeing to spur action. Images can jolt
people with power into concern. It was images of crowds grinning at
lynchings and mob domination of justice that shocked the conscience
of the nation and spurred the criminal procedure revolution.217 And it
212

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 66.
214 Whren, 517 U.S. at 808-09.
215 See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 68, at 384; Capers, Fourth Problem, supra note 68, at
435 n.34.
216 See, e.g., NAT’L MUSEUM OF AFRICAN AM. HISTORY & CULTURE, DOUBLE EXPOSURE:
CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PROMISE OF EQUALITY 10-55 (Laura Coyle & Michèle Gates
Moresi eds., 2015) (offering examples of iconic photographs in the struggle for civil
rights).
217 See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 2, at 56-57, 61, 69 (discussing linkages between
the birth of modern criminal procedure and mob-dominated trials in the shadow of
the threat of lynchings, documented by newspapers); see also, e.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK,
COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 35-38 (2000)
(discussing how the images were used in Cold War era propaganda against the United
213
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was images of mass protests, of the slain, of the events preceding
death, and of children offering hugs and seeking a safer future that
spurred the body camera revolution.218
Beyond the headlines, in the daily work of courts, body camera
video has an important role to play in improving the accuracy and
quality of justice in criminal procedure cases. This Part proposes rules
of judicial review to cultivate regular use of the audiovisual record in
criminal procedure cases and discourage gaps and omissions due to
selective recording. While this Part argues for the normalization of
judicial reliance on the audiovisual record, it also offers rules of
judicial restraint so that the audiovisual record is properly used.
A. Standardizing the Audiovisual Record, Questioning Absences
The transformation of the evidentiary record by body camera video
in criminal procedure cases is an important advance to address the
problems with traditional reliance on testimony and text and the
frequent absence of the defendant’s voice. Cameras can help prove
accurate claims, disprove false claims, and give judges and juries a
better sense of how quickly and stressfully events can unfold for
officers and suspects — as well as what it is like to be on the receiving
end of a search or seizure.219 Features on video storage systems
regulate and track access to the video and can prevent editing and
tampering.220 Policies may also limit officers’ ability to access or edit
the stored video and ensure proper chain-of-custody for the
evidence.221 Video replay can be an important improvement over
States and the influence on the Court); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS:
HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 30-59
(1994) (discussing how media images of violence influenced civil rights).
218 See, e.g., Ehrenfreund, supra note 16 (discussing how the most major reform to
arise from the Ferguson protests may be body cameras for police officers); Sanburn,
supra note 16 (discussing the call for body cameras by Michael Brown’s family,
presenting protest images, and noting the rapid uptake of body camera reforms).
219 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 133, at 6 (reporting agencies’
experience that having body cameras leads to a quicker and more accurate resolution
and reduces unfounded complaints); see also supra Part I (discussing how video
bettered captured an invasive search experience than police reports or testimony).
220 See, e.g., Alexander Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat, Danah Boyd, Police Body-Worn
Cameras 6 (Data & Soc’y Research Inst., Working Paper, 2015),
http://www.datasociety.net/pubs/dcr/PoliceBodyWornCameras.pdf (discussing the
security features of various systems).
221 See, e.g., CHULA VISTA POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL § 449.8 (2015),
https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/ChulaVistaPD_CA-BWC-Policy.pdf (“All audio and
video recordings are part of the investigative record and shall be preserved in their
original format without deletion, editing or tampering according to the retention
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reconstruction by error-prone memory and ugly credibility contests.222
Event replay can also fill information gaps in a system where the
defendant has strong incentives to remain silent.223
Judges should regularly consult videos in adjudicating search and
seizure suppression issues, where much of criminal procedure law is
forged. On preliminary matters, such as whether evidence must be
suppressed because it was seized in violation of the defendant’s rights,
judges are the designated fact-finders who must resolve disputed
questions of fact as well as law.224 Body camera footage can be an
important aid in this duty. The ability to replay what happened on the
ground also serves an important communicative and educative
function in a system where the judges adjudicating criminal procedure
questions tend to come from very different backgrounds and
experiences than the people involved in criminal procedure cases.225
As Judge Kozinski put it:
Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or sex, are selected from
the class of people who don’t live in trailers or urban ghettos.
The everyday problems of people who live in poverty are not
close to our hearts and minds because that’s not how we and
our friends live.226

schedule. . . . Unauthorized tampering, editing or deletion of a video may result in
discipline, up to and including termination.”); GREENSBORO POLICE DEP’T, GREENSBORO
POLICE DEPARTMENT DIRECTIVES MANUAL, DIRECTIVE NO. 5.11 (2014),
https://rcfp.org/bodycam_policies/NC/Greensboro_BWC_Policy.pdf (“No officer shall
attempt to erase, edit or otherwise alter any data captured by a BWC.”); NORFOLK
POLICE DEP’T, ADMINISTRATIVE SPECIAL ORDER 15-001: BODY-WORN CAMERAS 2 (2015),
https://acluva.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2015NorfolkPDPolicy.pdf (“Officers
shall not edit, erase, duplicate, copy, share, or otherwise distribute in any manner
BWC recordings without prior written authorization and approval by the Chief of
Police.”).
222 See discussion supra Sections I.A.2–.3.
223 See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
224 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question
about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so
deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”); Fields
v. Bagley, 275 F.3d 478, 485 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that the trial court’s factual
findings must be “supported by competent and credible evidence”).
225 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2629 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]the Federal Judiciary is hardly a cross-section of America. Take, for
example, this Court, which consists of only nine men and women, all of them
successful lawyers who studied at Harvard or Yale Law School. . . . [It is] a select,
patrician, highly unrepresentative panel . . . .”).
226 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

2017]

Justice Visualized

941

Judges are less likely to have ever experienced a stop, search or arrest
beyond a brief traffic stop, or the patdown and bag searches at the
entrance to airports or entertainment venues. Judges are also unlikely
to have to have had experience responding to an emergency call about
a crime in progress, or any of the myriad stressful situations that
officers face. Body camera footage can convey the realities both
defendants and officers face outside the courtroom.
As body camera evidence accumulates, it can be a valuable source of
big data for courts to inform decision-making and evaluate rules of
constitutional criminal procedure. Andrew Crespo has illuminated the
potential of what he terms systemic facts to redress criminal courts’
transactional myopia — the case-specific focus on the facts rather than
the larger pattern of data stored by courts.227 Systemic facts refer to
data that courts acquire over time by processing a stream of cases.228
This is a conceptually distinct from the traditional categories of
adjudicative (case-specific) facts and legislative facts (externally
generated general facts about the world).229 Courts have privileged
access to systemic facts stored in filing cabinets, online data systems
and transcripts, which can be amassed and analyzed to shed light into
opaque and important criminal procedure issues.230 For example,
search warrant affidavits and returns listing any items seized can be
digitized and searched by full-text, high-speed software to evaluate
issues such as boilerplate recitation, descriptive accuracy and even
predictive accuracy.231 Audio and images from video provide an even
richer trove of information besides searchable databases of text and
numbers.232 Such videos may be a powerful source of relevant
information beyond a single case featuring the parties recorded
because of the systemic facts that the accumulated data reveals.
Event replay and video evidence can better inform the work of
appellate judges as well as magistrate judges and trial judges.233 In
227 Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in
Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016).
228 See id. at 2066-68.
229 Id. at 2066. For a review of the differences between adjudicative and legislative
facts, see Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942); Kenneth Culp Davis,
Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955).
230 Crespo, supra note 227, at 2072-75.
231 Id. at 2074-85.
232 See supra Part I.A., discussing the problems with the primacy of onedimensional text.
233 In the federal system, magistrate judges have the power to make proposed
findings of fact and recommendations to district court judges. United States v.
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appeals of search and seizure suppression matters, appellate courts
review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error.234 Mixed
questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo.235 While appellate
courts are typically viewed as confined to paper records, reviewing
video files gives appellate courts the full basis to assess whether factual
findings below were clearly erroneous and to review mixed questions
of fact and law de novo.236 Video reviewed and admitted below should
be as much a part of the relevant record on appeal as traditional paper
transcripts of testimony.237
Yet practices regarding viewing video — or even whether the record
on review even includes video — vary among courts.238 Some courts
have explicitly held that video evidence admitted in the trial courts is a
necessary part of the record on appeal.239 Remarkably, however, some
appellate courts still do not even get the video as part of the record
transmitted on appeal, even though the parties showed the video in
the suppression hearing below.240 And even if they receive the video in
the record on appeal, some appellate judges refuse to view them in

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1980). These proposed findings and recommendations
are given “such weight as [their] merit commands and the sound discretion of the
judge warrants.” Id. (quoting Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976)).
234 E.g., United States v. French, 291 F.3d 945, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134, 1136 (10th Cir. 1993).
235 French, 291 F.3d at 950-51; Williamson, 1 F.3d at 1136.
236 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining
that courts reviewing a motion to suppress based on live testimony accept the trial
court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous).
237 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 68 F.3d 1242, 1243 n.1 (10th Cir. 1995)
(noting that the entire contested police encounter was recorded on video with audio
and this tape was admitted into evidence and designated as part of the record on
appeal and that “[a]ll facts recited [in the opinion’s statement of the facts] that are not
accompanied by a record cite have been taken from the video-audio recording”).
238 See, e.g., State v. Reid, 722 S.E.2d 364, 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (“The stop was
recorded on video, and the video was shown to the court below at the hearing on the
motion to suppress, but no copy of the video appears in the record on appeal.”);
Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 366 (Ind. 2014) (“We consider video evidence
admitted in the trial court to be a necessary part of the record on appeal, just like any
other type of evidence.”); State v. Lyon, 862 N.W.2d 391, 393 n.1 (Iowa 2015)
(viewing dash camera footage on appeal and finding it inconclusive on the issues);
State v. Rascon, No. 30,561, 2011 WL 704472 at *2 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2011)
(refusing to view video on appeal).
239 E.g., Robinson, 5 N.E.3d, at 366.
240 See, e.g., Reid, 722 S.E.2d, at 365 n.2 (noting the absence of the video even
though the parties discuss the video and the video was viewed by the trial court).
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reviewing suppression questions though the judge admitted the video
below.241
Part of the reason for varying practices is confusion over whether
the very act of viewing the video constitutes a reweighing of the
evidence.242 The position is puzzling. Appellate judges still have a duty
to determine if the factual findings were clearly erroneous if
defendants contest the suppression hearing findings on appeal.243
Moreover, on mixed questions of law and fact, appellate judges have
the duty of reviewing the suppression issue de novo.244 Why should
judges blind themselves to an important part of the record in carrying
out their duty of review? It is similar to reviewing whether the
testimony and other evidence adduced at the suppression hearing
directly contradicts the trial court’s findings, rendering them clearly
erroneous. The fear of the audiovisual record seems to reflect the
traditional association of text with rationality and the fallacy that
“thinking in words is the only kind of thinking there is.”245 Traditional
text-bound courts are puzzled about how to incorporate the explosion
of images that technology permits.246
Another reason for variations in whether appellate courts review
video introduced below is simply mechanical — the video may not
have been transmitted in the record on appeal with the paper file.247
Where the video is missing from the record, it should be
supplemented sua sponte even if the parties fail to request
supplementation.248 In a time of transition from traditional paper
241

See, e.g., Rascon, 2011 WL 704472, at *2 (refusing to view video on appeal).
For a discussion see, for example, Robinson, 5 N.E.3d, at 365-67.
243 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that
determinations of whether there was probable cause or reasonable articulable
suspicion for a search or seizure should be reviewed de novo while findings of
historical fact are reviewed for clear error); Frazier v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.3d
448, 452 (Ky. 2013) (“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a suppression motion, an
appellate court must first determine if the trial court’s factual findings are not clearly
erroneous and are supported by substantial evidence. . . . A de novo review of the trial
court’s application of the law to the facts completes the analysis.” (citations omitted)).
244 E.g., United States v. French, 291 F.3d 945, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134, 1136 (10th Cir. 1993).
245 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 41, at 4.
246 See Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687,
1691-92, 1715-16 (2014) (discussing how textbound courts are lagging behind the
proliferation of images).
247 See, e.g., State v. Reid, 722 S.E.2d 364, 365 n.2 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (noting “no
copy of the video appears in the record on appeal” though it was viewed at the
suppression hearing and is argued by the defendant in his brief).
248 Cf. id. (“No one has asked us to order the supplementation of the record, and
242
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records to multimedia records, it is important for courts to take the
lead even if the parties are uncertain or confused to ensure that the
appellate record is complete.
Trial and appellate judges also have an important role to play in
protecting against selective recording. In jurisdictions that require
recording, where video is missing or part of an event is unrecorded,
judges should inquire into the reasons for the gaps and omissions. The
unavailability of video evidence despite departmental policy requiring
recording is relevant in drawing inferences on disputed questions of
fact. Drawing inferences based on omissions is a practice elsewhere in
the law. For example, in the context of toxic tort and environmental
litigation, spoliation of evidence — the failure to preserve evidence
potentially favorable to an adversary in reasonably foreseeable
litigation — can be the basis of adverse inferences.249 Regular judicial
inquiry into gaps and omissions can help deter selective recording.
Such selective recording defeats the purpose of transitioning to body
cameras in promoting public trust and greater transparency and
reliability of evidence. Anticipation of regular judicial inquiry gives
departments a nudge to realize the full potential of the benefits of
body camera evidence.
Judicial nudges should not become penalty sticks that deter police
departments from transitioning to body cameras, however. Despite the
spreading of body cameras in departments across the nation, some
police chiefs are adopting a wait and see approach, concerned about
suffering the slings and arrows of technological malfunctions. As one
chief put it:
This reminds me of a similar effort to get cameras into police
cars in the mid 1990’s. The technology of the time, usually a
consumer-grade camera recording to 8mm tape, was really not
up to the task, and many departments plunged headlong into
video systems only to find that they had inadvertently created
their own nightmare. They didn’t plan for such things as the
cost and logistics of storing and retrieving video, training,
tagging evidentiary clips, installing, maintaining, and replacing
equipment.
under the circumstances of this case, we decline to exercise our discretion to do so sua
sponte. . . . [I]t is not the responsibility of this Court to ensure that the appellate
record is complete.”).
249 E.g., Enstrom v. Garden Place Hotel, 811 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264-65 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006); Roberta R. Wilson & James O’Toole, Jr., Spoliation Concerns in Enviro, Toxic
Tort Litigation, LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
77528/spoliation-concerns-in-enviro-toxic-tort-litigation.
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By the end of the decade, you could commonly read news
stories about departments where half of the cameras were out
of service at any given time, or the department was scrambling
to find money to replace broken and outdated equipment. The
problem abated as some departments scaled back their
installations to a manageable number, and as the technology
improved. Today, digital in-car camera systems are a much
more mature technology, and though expensive, we’ve learned
the lessons of the 1990s on how to make such a program
work. I’m glad in hindsight that we didn’t dive into the water
too early in Lincoln, and waited until the technology
improved.250
Technology is fallible. The technology is also new and takes time to
master. For now, the training wheels are on and judicial inquiry into
omissions and gaps should reflect sensitivity to this transition phase.
Inquiry can be a nudge but a penalty for omissions can be a cudgel to
deter uptake of body cameras and policies that require recording of a
broader swathe of enforcement activities.
B. The Judicial Role in Reducing Privacy Harms
While potentially beneficial, body-worn cameras also represent the
multiplication of pervasive surveillance devices on the streets and even
in homes when people call for help or officers execute warrants.251
Good reasons may exist to turn off the camera to protect privacy or
victims and witnesses — particularly because public disclosure laws in
some states may subject recordings to release.252 The privacy arm of
this study found substantial variation on when cameras should be
turned off to protect privacy.253 While provisions requiring camera
shut-off in restrooms, hospitals, and with informants are prevalent,
there is much less consensus on sensitive contexts such as recording
of minors, witnesses, and victims, including sexual assault or domestic
violence victims.254
250

Casady, supra note 29.
Cf. Suggested Guidelines on Use of Body Cameras by Police, ACLU (Sept. 8, 2014,
8:40 AM), http://www.aclu-il.org/statement-regarding-use-of-body-cameras-by-police/
(discussing the need for privacy-protective policies that prevent “the use of body cams
from becoming another broad surveillance tool”).
252 Fan, Police Body Cameras, supra note 20, at 397-404, 411-12.
253 The results are reported, and the tension between privacy and public disclosure
laws is analyzed, in id. at 426-30.
254 Id. at 428-29.
251
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In the absence of consensus or even explicit guidance, officer
discretion may be the only safeguard for victims, witnesses and minors
having their most painful moments posted on Youtube.255 Judicial
inquiry into gaps and omissions in recording should thus be sensitive
to this reality. Officers should not be deterred from protecting minors
or victims of painful or intimate crimes by the risk of censure in court.
The lack of recording should be acceptable to courts where officers
have a reasonable articulable privacy reason for why the camera was
shut off.
Courts already have experience applying the reasonable articulable
basis standard in the context of reviewing Terry stops and cursory
searches for officer safety.256 The standard is lower than probable
cause because of the protective and preventative nature of the
power.257 In the case of justified non-recording, the protective purpose
is the privacy of victims and witnesses rather than officer safety. The
requirement of an objective basis beyond a conclusory assertion but
one that is not so high as to chill protective efforts is similarly useful
in this context.
Courts can also supplement gaps in law, policy and discretion when
vulnerable victims and embarrassing moments are caught on camera.
Judges may order redaction of addresses and people’s faces so that they
are not readily identifiable.258 Courts also have the power to seal
evidence from general public disclosure and prohibit the parties from
disseminating privacy-intrusive recordings released for purposes of
judicial proceedings.259

255

Id. at 397-404, 411-12.
See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“In Terry, we held that
an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory
stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot. While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause
and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, . . . [we
require] at least a minimal level of objective justification . . . .”).
257 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 329, 332-36 (1990).
258 See, e.g., Showing Animals Respect & Kindness v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 730
F. Supp. 2d 180, 196-97 (D.D.C. 2010) (ordering redactions of video to protect
privacy); Cape Publ’ns v. City of Louisville, 147 S.W.3d 731, 732-35 (Ky. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that sexual assault victim information could be redacted from police
reports to protect privacy); State v. Densmore, 624 A.2d 1138, 1144 (Vt. 1993)
(noting that the privacy interests of victims may justify redactions).
259 See, e.g., In re N.Y. Times Co., 834 F.2d 1152, 1154 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that
sealing or redaction may be warranted to protect privacy); Dampman v. Morgenthau,
599 N.Y.S.2d 390, 398-99 (N.Y. App. Term 1993) (noting that courts may seal records
to protect the privacy of victims, witnesses, and the defendant).
256
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C. Rules of Judicial Restraint for Multimedia Interpretation
The replay power coming to courts, while bigger and better than
ever before, has important limitations. Replay via body camera footage
is not like instant replay in sports.260 Modern-day instant replay in
sports relies on several camera angles mounted on stable positions to
optimize clarity and viewing vantage.261 In contrast, body cameras are
mounted on officers in motion.262 The camera catches a single
perspective at an angle.263 The vantage point from an officer’s head or
chest is much better than previously available via dash camera but that
does not mean it is capable of catching the full truth, or even the
relevant truth.264 Thus while body camera footage should be regularly
consulted, it should be consulted with care and understanding about
the limits of video evidence.
1.

Objectivity, Subjectivity and the Camera Eye

Camera footage is often portrayed as better than human accounts at
capturing the objective truth. The oft-expressed hope for body
cameras is to “provide an unbiased audio and video recording of
events that officers encounter.”265 Images seem to represent a direct
window into reality unsullied by human manipulation or
misperception of the truth.266 Images have the power to persuade by
suggesting a transparent depiction of reality without discernible resort
to rhetoric. 267 The seductive power of images obscures the fact that
the meaning one derives is structured by camera framing, and by one’s

260 See,
e.g., History of Instant Replay, NFL FOOTBALL OPERATIONS,
http://operations.nfl.com/the-game/history-of-instant-replay/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2016), (offering history of the evolution of instant replay to the sophisticated system
today).
261 Id.
262 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 6 (describing body-worn camera
resolution specifications and mounting considerations to capture data).
263 See id.
264 See, e.g., DALL. POLICE DEP’T, GEN. ORDER 3XX.00 BODY WORN CAMERAS 1 (“The
department recognizes that BWC images have a limited field of view and cannot
always show the full story, nor do video images capture an entire scene.”).
265 PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 4.21 (2015); see also, e.g., AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T,
POLICY MANUAL, POLICY 303, at 132 (2015) (“The use of Body Worn Digital Recording
(BWDR) system provides an unbiased audio/video recording of events that employees
encounter.”).
266 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 41, at 8.
267 Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 683, 692 (2012).
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own worldviews and experiences.268 Moreover, the relevant truth may
not be the camera’s depiction.269
While the camera seems to be an unbiased eye, camera perspective
can powerfully shape viewer judgments without the viewer realizing
this effect.270 The key studies of the impact of camera perspective on
viewer judgment in the criminal procedure context come from studies
of videotaped interrogations.271 Psychologists found that pointing the
camera so that the viewer is directly facing the suspect makes the
viewer more likely to believe the suspect voluntarily made the
statements during interrogation.272 This subtle shaping of decision
making by camera perspective arises because of a phenomenon called
illusory causation.273 People attribute more causal influence over an
exchange to the person they are facing simply because that person is
more salient, a cognitive bias also dubbed the salience effect.274
Professional expertise apparently does not defuse the power of
camera perspective.275 Judges and law enforcement officers are also
susceptible to the camera perspective effect.276 Viewers are most likely
to rate a confession as coerced if the camera is pointing at the detective
and least likely if the camera is pointed at the suspect.277 Focusing a
camera on the suspect and detective equally moderates this point-ofview bias.278
268 Id. at 689-90; see also Vivian Yee & Kirk Johnson, Body Cameras Worn by Police
Officers Are No ‘Safeguard of Truth,’ Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2014, at A1
(discussing divergent interpretations of video).
269 See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
270 G. Daniel Lassiter, Shari Seidman Diamond, Heather C. Schmidt & Jennifer K.
Elek, Evaluating Videotaped Confessions: Expertise Provides No Defense Against the
Camera-Perspective Effect, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 224, 224-25 (2007) [hereinafter Evaluating
Videotaped Confessions]; G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Further Evidence of a Robust Point-ofView Bias in Videotaped Confessions, 21 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 265, 267 (2002)
[hereinafter Further Evidence]; see G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Attributional Complexity
and the Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped Confessions, 27 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 27, 28-29 (2005) [hereinafter Attributional Complexity].
271 Lassiter et al., Further Evidence, supra note 270, at 266-84; see Lassiter et al.,
Attributional Complexity, supra note 270, at 28-29; Lassiter et al., Evaluating Videotaped
Confessions, supra note 270, at 224.
272 Lassiter et al., Attributional Complexity, supra note 270, at 28.
273 Id. at 27-28.
274 Id.; Lassiter et al., Further Evidence, supra note 270, at 267.
275 Lassiter et al., Evaluating Videotaped Confessions, supra note 270, at 225.
276 Id. at 224-25.
277 Lassiter et al., Further Evidence, supra note 270, at 268-69.
278 Id. at 269; see Lassiter et al., Evaluating Videotaped Confessions, supra note 270,
at 224-25.
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The impact of body camera perspective remains to be studied. We
can draw some insights from cinematic theory as well as the camera
perspective studies in the interrogation context. Unlike the camera in
the interrogation context, body cameras are highly mobile rather than
a fixed stationary perspective trained on the suspect. An important
feature of body cameras is that it conveys the story from the officer’s
point of view, especially if the camera is placed at eye level. In
cinematic storytelling, a point of view shot is created by placing the
camera lens at the eye level of the character whose point of view we
are seeing.279 When we watch what is unfolding from a point-of-view
shot — the officer’s point of view, in the body camera context —we
get a sense of intimacy from seeing things from his subjective point of
view.280 This intimacy heightens sympathy for the officer’s perspective
because we have the sense of seeing through his eyes.281
Framing is likely to elicit more than just one-sided sympathy,
however. In a body camera frame, the officer is necessarily
disembodied, out of frame, except for perhaps a pair of hands
gesturing, or a knee or leg extending. Often, what is pictured close-up
is the suspect.282 Close-ups are also a framing technique that elicits
sympathy.283 The closer up we get, and the longer the close-up, the
more sympathy is likely to be elicited because of the physical
proximity associated with intimacy.284 So the close-up focus on
suspects may elicit sympathy — and likely a lot more sympathy than
comes from reading a police report about the encounter. On the other
hand, if the officer is focused on the suspect and pointing the camera
directly at him, then this perspective may trigger the illusory causation
effect that renders the viewer less likely to find the exchange
involuntary.285
When we listen to testimony or read affidavits or reports, we take
into consideration the source and make credibility assessments and
discounts for partiality.286 While our “common-sense” readings of
279

JENNIFER VAN SIJLL, CINEMATIC STORYTELLING 156 (Paul Norlen ed., 2005).
See id. (“POV shots give audiences an exaggerated sense of intimacy with the
character.”).
281 See id. at 156, 170 (“The POV shot generally lends sympathy to the protagonist
by allowing us to see through the character’s eyes.”).
282 For examples, see the stills, supra notes 58–59.
283 VAN SIJLL, supra note 279, at 148.
284 Id.
285 Lassiter et al., Attributional Complexity, supra note 270, at 28; Lassiter et al.,
Evaluating Videotaped Confessions, supra note 270, at 224; Lassiter et al., Further
Evidence, supra note 270, at 268-69.
286 Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility,
280
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witness credibility may be skewed by factors such as the witness
appearance, we are at least making judgments about the source’s
motives to present facts in a particular light.287 The persuasion by
camera perspective is not as readily understandable or known,
however. As the audiovisual record becomes a regular part of review,
fact-finders need to become more adept at understanding and
interpreting images as portrayals and discerning persuasion effects.
2.

The Proper Perceptual Yardsticks and Fact-Finders

Cameras may also tempt us to ignore the relevant standard on legal
questions where the proper yardstick should be what each person
perceived, not what a mounted machine can capture. Criminal
procedure standards often are based on human perceptions or what
the officer knew at the time of the event.288 For example the legal
standard for whether officers are engaging in interrogation or its
functional equivalent examines “the perceptions of the suspect” as
well as the officers’ conduct.289 Whether the officer had probable cause
to arrest a suspect is based on “the facts known to the arresting officer
at the time of the arrest.”290 Whether there was reasonable articulable
suspicion for a stop is also examined in light of the facts known to the
officer at the time.291 Whether there is a reasonable basis for a safety
search of a vehicle is also based on the facts known to the officer at the
time.292 And whether use of force is reasonable is also judged from the
perspective of the reasonable officer at the scene, knowing what the
officer knew at the time.293
Body-worn cameras may capture only part of what officers and
suspects see — or more than the parties can perceive, especially in
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 174-77 (1990).
287 See, e.g., Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1078-82
(1991) (discussing perceptual frailties in evaluating demeanor).
288 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700-01 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“As the Court recognizes, determinations of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion involve a two-step process. First, a court must identify all of the
relevant historical facts known to the officer at the time of the stop or search; and
second, it must decide whether, under a standard of objective reasonableness, those
facts would give rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop or probable cause to
search.”).
289 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
290 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152-53 (2004).
291 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1968).
292 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 n.11 (1983).
293 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
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stressful law enforcement situations. The San Diego Police
Department’s policy provides an important caution applicable to
courts as well as officers:
Video cannot always show the full story nor does it capture an
entire scene. . . . Persons reviewing recordings must also be
cautious before conclusions are reached about what the video
shows. . . .
BWCs [body-worn cameras] have a field of vision of either 75
degrees for the Flex or 130 degrees for the Axon. While
human beings have a field of vision of 180 degrees, the human
brain has a field of attention of 50-60 degrees. Under stress,
this field can narrow down to a ½ degree. Stress also induces
auditory exclusion and prevents the brain from analyzing and
remembering all the stimuli that it takes in through the senses.
Officers make decisions based on the totality of the human
senses. An officer’s recollection of specific details may be
different than what is captured in digital evidence since BWCs
only capture audio and video. 294
If video is elevated as the objective truth — and officers are
regularly encouraged or even required to view the video before writing
reports — then there is intense pressure to conform memory and
accounts to the video even when human perceptions may have been
different than what was recorded.295 Courts as well as officers need to
understand why good-faith testimony may diverge from camera
recording and avoid pressures to force-fit human recollections into a
machine recording. Moreover, where the appropriate yardstick are the
knowledge and the perceptions of persons at the time of the event, the
temptation to privilege what is captured on video as the higher truth
must be resisted.
Another important issue in determining the relevant truth is the
appropriate fact-finder, which differs depending on the procedural
posture of the case and the type of criminal procedure issue raised. On
factual questions properly reserved for a jury, such as matters that go
294

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, SAN DIEGO POLICE DEP’T PROCEDURE NO. 1.49 1, 11 (2015).
See, e.g., DIR. T. ARMSTRONG, MEMPHIS POLICE DEP’T, POLICY AND PROCEDURE
INFORMATION AND UPDATES, SERIAL 12-15 § IV.F (2015) (requiring that officers review
body-worn camera footage before writing reports);CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 294,
at 11 (requiring that officers review digital evidence before completing reports to
prime their recollection but “shall not write their reports based solely on what they
viewed from the BWC recording”).
295
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to guilt, innocence or liability, judicial restraint is required to resist
substituting the interpretations of judges for the interpretation of
juries.296 What might seem to obviously meet a standard to one viewer
may be interpreted differently by another because image interpretation
is filtered through the worldview and experiences of the perceiver.297
The distinction between video interpretation properly reserved for
the courts versus the jury is raised by the Supreme Court’s reliance on
dash camera video in Scott v. Harris.298 The plaintiff in the case sued
the police after he crashed and became a quadriplegic when police
tried to halt his high-speed flight by executing a maneuver that causes
cars to spin to a stop.299 The district court denied the officers’ motion
for summary judgment and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on
interlocutory appeal, ruling that there was a sufficient basis to proceed
to trial on whether the force used by police was reasonable.300
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court disagreed with both lower
courts.301 The Court ruled that no reasonable juror could agree with
the plaintiff’s account that the police used excessive force to stop him
during a high-speed vehicle pursuit captured on dash camera.302 The
dash camera videos of the chase played a crucial role in the Supreme
Court’s decision.303 Scholars expressed concern that an appellate court
was usurping the role of jurors in interpreting facts portrayed by
images subject to divergent interpretations.304
Many of the factual disputes in criminal procedure cases are
resolved by judges rather than juries, however, because the
exclusionary rule remains the central remedy to enforce constitutional
criminal procedure protections.305 Determining whether evidence is
296 See, e.g., United States v. Pope, 613 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The
jury is, of course, charged with determining the general issue of a defendant’s guilt or
innocence. Fact-finding by the district court based on evidence that goes to this
question can risk trespassing on territory reserved to the jury as the ultimate finder of
fact in our criminal justice system.”).
297 Kahan et al., supra note 31, at 840-47, 865-80.
298 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 74
(“[I]t is deeply troubling when an appellate court, acting on its own, watches a tape
and decides the facts of a case for itself.”); Kahan et al., supra note 31, at 841-42
(arguing the Court was wrong to privilege its own view of the video and deny jurors
the opportunity to interpret it based on their worldviews).
299 Scott, 550 U.S. at 375-76.
300 Id. at 376.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 386.
303 See id. at 378-79.
304 E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 74; Kahan et al., supra note 31, at 841-42.
305 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961) (noting “the obvious futility
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admissible is the province of judges.306 In evaluating admissibility,
including whether the exclusionary remedy applies, judges play the
key role in resolving disputed questions of fact central to determining
whether constitutional rights were violated.307 On such questions, trial
and appellate judges should be able to replay contested events
captured on video and interpret their legal significance to improve the
accuracy of justice and lift the traditional blinders.
CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL CULTIVATION AND UPTAKE
Much of the current focus is on how body cameras will play in the
court of public opinion to rebuild public trust and demonstrate police
accountability.308 Yet there is another crucial audience for body
camera video footage — the courts that forge criminal procedure law,
the primary rules governing police.309 The hundreds of thousands of
hours of video footage coming to courts from the body camera
revolution have the potential to transform the traditional reliance on
testimony and text in adjudicating the search and seizure disputes that
shape the course of criminal procedure law.310
Salient stories and dramatic events, such as officer-involved
shootings or alleged body cavity searches at the roadside, tend to seize
public attention.311 Yet most of the hundreds of thousands of hours of
of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection of other remedies”); Anthony
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 360 (1974)
(stating the exclusionary rule is “the primary instrument for enforcing the [F]ourth
[A]mendment”).
306 FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
307 See sources cited supra notes 34, 64, 224.
308 E.g., Neill Franklin, Body Cameras Could Restore Trust in the Police, N.Y. TIMES,
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/22/should-policewear-cameras/body-cameras-could-restore-trust-in-police; Adam A. Marshall & Katie
Townsend, A Tool to Gain the Public’s Trust, WASH. POST (May 15, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-tool-to-gain-the-publics-trust/2015/05/
15/f7f9ad14-f4f8-11e4-84a6-6d7c67c50db0_story.html; Nedra Pickler, Associated
Press, Police Need Body Cameras to Build Trust with Public, Obama Says, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES PICAYUNE (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2014/12/
obama_police_body_cameras.html; Justice Department Announces $20 Million in
Funding to Support Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program, DEPT. JUST. (May 1, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-20-million-fundingsupport-body-worn-camera-pilot-program.
309 See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 2, at 2470-90 (discussing how constitutional
criminal procedure is a chief source of the conduct rules for police).
310 See discussion supra Parts I, II.
311 See, e.g., Randy Balko, These Videos of a Texas Police Shooting Show How Body
Cameras Can Vindicate Good Cops, WASH. POST (July 2, 2015), https://www.
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video footage that police departments across the nation will generate
are of everyday law enforcement activities such as initiating
consensual encounters, stops, and patdowns, often in response to calls
for service from the community.312 These everyday searches and
seizures are the main staples of criminal procedure and the criminal
justice system and are of great importance to courts.
Consider the still below from body camera video.313 The camera
footage is from a consensual encounter.314 The officers received three
calls for service, each reporting what the caller believes to be a
suspicious-looking man, possibly intoxicated, on the sidewalk in front
of a service center for women and children.315 The callers indicated
they saw the man put his hand inside his pants, then remove the
hand.316 Is the man lawfully hanging out on a public street and
scratching his groin? Or is there some potential criminality or danger?
To investigate, the officers approach the man and ask a series of
questions about where he is going, where he has been and why he
happens to be on that street corner, to confirm or dispel whether there
is reasonable suspicion for a stop and frisk or probable cause for an
arrest.317

washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/07/02/these-videos-of-a-texas-policeshooting-show-how-body-cameras-can-vindicate-good-cops/; Deborah Hastings, Texas
State Troopers Caught on Camera Probing Women’s Privates Aren’t Isolated Incidents, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 2, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/troopers-texas-probe-genitals-women-traffic-stops-article-1.1414668; AJ Vicens &
Jaeah Lee, Here Are 13 Killings by Police Captured on Video in the Past Year, MOTHER JONES
(May 20, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/05/police-shootings-caughton-tape-video; Video: Dramatic Police Shooting in Las Vegas Caught on Body Camera, ABC7
(Las Vegas) (July 16, 2015), http://abc7.com/news/video-dramatic-police-shooting-invegas-caught-on-body-cam/855728/.
312 See discussion supra Part II.B.
313 Police Video Requests, Suspicious Person, YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2014) [hereinafter
Suspicious Person Call for Service Body Camera Video], https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=yFbu1tdG0rQ.
314 See generally supra text accompanying notes 187–191.
315 Suspicious Person Call for Service Body Camera Video, supra note 313, at 0:41-0:50.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 1:23-8:29.
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Body camera footage of officers responding to calls for service about
a suspicious person and engaging in a consensual encounter.

The video of this consensual encounter is not as dramatic as those
that tend to get the most airplay in the court of public opinion. Yet
such video footage is crucial to the work of courts adjudicating
common questions such as whether officer had reasonable articulable
suspicion for stop and frisk318 or probable cause for an arrest319 and
thus a proper basis for a search incident to arrest.320 One of the goals
of this article’s coding and analysis of body camera policies in police
departments serving the 100 largest cities is to show this major
paradigm shift in the evidence available to courts in body camera
jurisdictions.321
The body camera revolution is thus also potentially revolutionary
for courts, relieving the traditional reliability on testimony — often
just from one side — to reconstruct events.322 When the defendant
disputes the account of what happened in officer reports and
testimony, the court has another source of information besides deeply
divergent stories and ugly credibility contests that leave neither officer
318 See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 2122 (1968).
319 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-23 (1976).
320 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 228-35 (1973).
321 See discussion supra Part II.
322 See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
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nor defendant unscathed.323 Video offers a check on the fallibility of
human perception, giving adjudicators the ability to replay events and
perceive them free of the passions and partisanship of being one of the
adversarial parties.324
Courts have an important role to play in cultivating the spread of
body cameras and the normalization of the audiovisual record in
adjudicating search and seizure suppression motions.325 In
jurisdictions with mandatory body camera recording policies, body
camera video should be an important source of information for judges
in finding the facts and deciding suppression motions.326 The
increasing utilization of video viewing can reduce the need to sort
through wildly divergent accounts because the parties are constrained
in what they can claim by the audiovisual record.327 Where recording
is required but the disputed enforcement event is unrecorded, courts
should inquire into the reason why.328 Judicial nudges should not be
cudgels to deter voluntary police department uptake of body cameras,
however. Technology is fallible.329 Cameras may fail or risk violating
the privacy or safety of victims and witnesses.330 Courts should accept
reasonable explanations without penalty lest other departments
considering adopting body cameras be deterred from voluntarily
undertaking reform.
Finally, rules of judicial restraint are also needed as body camera
video replay becomes a regular part of judicial review. The power to
replay events is an important evidentiary advance but it also has
pitfalls.331 While there is a tendency to privilege the video as revealing
the truth impartially, what a camera can capture may not always be
the relevant truth, nor convey one story free of framing effects and the
subjectivity of viewer perception.332 In criminal procedure, people are
judged by what was reasonable and known to them at the time, in the
heat and stress of the moment, rather than all that a machine can
dispassionately capture.333 Just as one reads testimony and considers
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333

See discussion supra Section I.A.3.
See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra note 250.
See discussion supra notes 249–53 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Sections III.C.1–2.
See discussion supra Section III.C.1.
See discussion supra notes 288–93.
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the perspective of the perceiver and the proper fact-finder for resolving
disputes, one should interpret video and consider the perspective from
which it is mounted and the proper fact-finder for resolving
interpretative disputes. The great promise of body camera video
evidence should be cultivated with care to realize its promise without
abdicating the proper perceptual yardsticks and judicial restraint.
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APPENDIX
Police Departments Serving One of the 100 Largest Cities in the
United States with Obtainable Body Camera Policies Coded in this
Study.
1. New York, NY
2. Los Angeles, CA
3. Chicago, IL
4. Houston, TX
5. Philadelphia, PA
6. Phoenix, AZ
7. San Diego, CA
8. Dallas, TX
9. San Jose, CA
10. Austin, TX
11. San Francisco, CA
12. Fort Worth, TX
13. Charlotte, NC
14. Memphis, TN
15. Seattle, WA
16. Denver, CO
17. Washington, DC
18. Baltimore, MD
19. Louisville, KY
20. Portland, OR (no departmental policy at the time of coding, but
we coded Oregon legislation)
21. Milwaukee, WI
22. Las Vegas, NV
23. Albuquerque, NM
24. Tucson, AZ
25. Fresno, CA
26. Atlanta, GA
27. Miami, FL
28. Oakland, CA
29. Cleveland, OH
30. Wichita, KS
31. New Orleans, LA
32. Anaheim, CA
33. Corpus Christi, TX (no departmental policy at the time of
coding, but we coded Texas legislation)
34. Greensboro, NC
35. Chula Vista, CA
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36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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Norfolk, VA
Chandler, AZ
Durham, NC
Winston-Salem, NC
Chesapeake, VA
Scottsdale, AZ
Fremont, CA
Gilbert, AZ
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